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GRAY MARKET GOODS AND COPYRIGHT
LAW: AN END RUN AROUND K MART
V. CARTIER
Gray market goods bear an authorized United States trademark or em-
body an authorized copy of copyrighted material, but are intended for
sale outside the United States and have entered the country without the
trademark or copyright owner's consent.' During the 1980s, the gray
market exploded in size, primarily in response to variations in the
strength of the dollar.2 Those who seek to outlaw the gray market, usu-
1. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v.
C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1382 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (describing gray
market goods as those that are intended for sale outside the United States and imported
without the United States trademark or copyright owner's consent), aff'd in related pro-
ceeding, Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d. 477, cert. denied, 115 S.
Ct. 1315 (1995); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (defin-
ing a gray market good as one legally sold abroad and subsequently imported into the
United States to compete against those sold by the United States trademark owner), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1164
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing gray market goods as those bearing trademarks lawfully ap-
plied abroad and reimported into the United States); see also Maureen Beyers, Note, The
Greying of American Trademarks: The Genuine Goods Exclusion Act and the Incongruity
of Customs Regulation 19 C.FR. § 133.21,54 FORDHAM L. REV. 83, 83-84 (1985) (defining
gray goods similarly).
Supporters of this practice refer to them as "parallel imports." Jamie S. Gorelick &
Rory K. Little, The Case for Parallel Importation, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205,207
n.5 (1986) (arguing that the phrase "gray market" has created an unjustified atmosphere of
borderline legality around this practice).
2. W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764 n.]
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (stating that gray markets are created when a speculator buys products
cheaply in one market and sells them for profit in another); SETH E. LIPNER, THE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF GRAY MARKET GOODS 3 (1990); David Bender & David A.
Gerber, In Wake of High Court Decision, The Gray Market Gets Grayer, THE NAT'L L.J.,
Sept. 19, 1988, at 15 (stating that when a good costs less in a foreign market than in the
United States, an incentive exists to import it).
For example, if a good costs $10 in country A and, because of the weakness of a foreign
currency relative to the dollar, $5 in country B, an incentive exists to import the good from
Country B into Country A and sell it for $7. The scheme works best for items that have a
high value relative to their weight. Hugh E. Hansen, Gray Market Goods: A Lighter Shade
of Black, 13 BROOK. J. Ir'L L. 249, 252 (1987) (stating that the lower shipping costs of
light, highly priced goods make them an attractive candidate for gray market importation);
Shubha Ghosh, An Economic Analysis of the Common Control Exception to Gray Market
Exclusion, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 373, 374-75 (1994) (recognizing that shipping costs
may negate the incentive to import goods); LEXECON, INC., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, THE
ECONOMICS OF GRAY MARKET IMPORTS 5 (1985) (unpublished report, on file with the
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ally the United States distributors of the corresponding domestic goods,3
argue that these gray marketers are "free riding",4 on the manufacturers'
goodwill.' Furthermore, they argue that some items sold through these
unauthorized channels, originally targeted for sale abroad, may differ no-
Catholic University Law Review) [hereinafter LEXECON EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (describ-
ing the active presence of light-weight products with well-known trademark reputations in
gray markets).
Currency fluctuations do not drive all gray market importation, however. Bender &
Gerber, supra, at 15; see also, e.g., Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1390 (noting that a manufac-
turer may decide to sell its product at a lower price to gain a competitive foothold in a new
market). Generally, a gray market probably will appear when the value added by United
States marketing investments totals less than shipping costs. See LEXECON EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, supra, at 4-5.
3. E.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 479 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101,
102 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (describing how the United States trademark owner brought suit
under § 42 of the Lanham Act); NEC Elec. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1507 (9th
Cir.) (wholly owned subsidiary suing to enjoin parallel importation),'cert. denied, 484 U.S.
451 (1987); Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enter., Inc., 226 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 344, 345 (S.D.
Fla. 1985) (exclusively licensed distributor suing to enjoin importation); see also LIPNER,
supra note 2, at 4 (describing the competition of gray market importers with authorized
dealers); COLLADO ASSOCIATES, INC.,THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DIVERSION 5 n.1 (1984)
(on file with the Catholic University of America. Law Review) [hereinafter COLLADO
STUDY] (focusing on free riding as the cause of competition between the gray market im-
porters and authorized dealers).
United States distributors are not the only opponents of the gray market, however. E.g.,
Legislation to Amend the Lanham Trademark Act Regarding Gray Market Goods: Hearing
on S.626 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 522-23 (1990) [hereinafter Senate Hearing on S. 626]
(statement of the National Council of Senior Citizens) (stating that the failure of some gray
market goods to meet United States health and safety standards presents health and safety
risks to consumers); see also id. at 126-29 (statement of John A. Boardman, Food and
Allied Trade Services Department, AFL-CIO) (arguing that the sale of gray market goods
destroys jobs along the domestic distribution chain).
4. Free riding can be described as the process by which one person avails himself of
the marketing and promotional efforts of another without compensation. See, e.g., Osawa,
589 F. Supp. at 1172 (describing how the gray marketer, who attracts customers to the
brand based entirely on price, benefits from the marketing and promotional efforts of the
United States trademark owner).
5. Goodwill is generally defined as favorable public perception attaching to goods
from a specific source. See White Tower System, Inc. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 90 F.2d
67, 69 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 720 (1937). The concept includes the brand's name
recognition and the purchaser's belief in the quality of the product. Premier Dental Prod.
Co. v. Darby Dental Supply Co., 794 F.2d 850, 853 n.3 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
950 (1986).
United States trademark owners argue that a firm investing the time and resources to
develop and promote its products through seminars, public relations campaigns, advertis-
ing, and extensive customer service will not be able to retail its product at the same price as
a dealer who bears none of these costs. Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1166; Premier Dental, 794
F.2d at 854; see also COLLADO STUDY, supra note 3, at 5-6; LEXECON INC., THE ECONOM-
ICS OF GRAY MARKET IMPORTS 26-30 (1985) [hereinafter LEXECON STUDY].
1996] Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law
ticeably from those sold by the authorized United States distributor.6
Gray market retailers, on the other hand, assert that the sale of these
goods benefits consumers because it prevents foreign manufacturers
from creating price differences between markets.7 Manufacturers fre-
quently sell merchandise on international markets at prices substantially
lower than those charged in the United States.' A manufacturer of a
good presumably acting in his own economic self-interest will sell the
good at a profit abroad.9 Thus, because he can equalize the prices be-
tween markets, the manufacturer holds the "key to their own release."'
10
Opponents of gray market importation suffered a severe setback in
K Mart v. Cartier." In K Mart, the Supreme Court upheld United States
Customs Service (Customs) regulations construing section 526 of the
Tariff Act of 1930.12 Customs permits the unauthorized importation of
6. See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 635
(1st Cir. 1992) (finding a difference between Venezuela-bound Perugina chocolate and that
destined for the United States); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 102-03
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding Sunlight dish soap intended for sale in Great Britain materially
different from that intended for sale in the United States); Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Elec., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (finding a material difference when
gray market Cabbage patch dolls came with Spanish instructions, and the seller would not
process the "adoption papers" and send birthday cards to the end purchaser), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 847 (1987).
When a consumer purchases a brand name that he recognizes, he buys it with a certain
expectation that could go unfulfilled because the manufacturer designed the goods to meet
the tastes or requirements of a different market. See, e.g., Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak
Trading, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1247 (D.N.J.) (finding a caloric difference between Tic Tac
mints destined for England and those intended for the United States, as well as differences
involving labeling and the type of sweetener employed), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir.),
rev'd on other grounds, 952 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1991); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp.
951, 952 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding difference in soap packaging and formulation to be
material).
7. See Gorelick & Little, supra note 1, at 206-07.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 206.
10. Id.; see also Richard A. Fogel, Note, Grey Market Goods and Modern Interna-
tional Commerce: A Question of Free Trade, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 308, 326 (1986).
Fogel's article, as well as Gorelick's article, cite tenuous support for their positions on this
point. Fogel's authority for the price discrimination argument comes from interviews with
a large discount retailer's general counsel. Id. at 320 n.66 (citing Raymond J. Wysocki,
Resale Price Maintenance and the Mass Market: A Separate Business Rebuttal to Professor
Baxter, 14(2) ANre'RusT L. & ECON. REv. 91, 99-100 (1985)). Gorelick and Little, for
their part, cite no authority for their proposition. See Gorelick and Little, supra note 1, at
207-09. But see Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 667 (3d Cir.) (describ-
ing how a foreign parent concerned about intrabrand competition from identical gray
goods may solve its problem by pulling its wares out of the United States market), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
11. 486 U.S. 281 (1987).
12. Id. at 294 (construing § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994)).
The statute provides:
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goods bearing a valid United States trademark if the United States trade-
mark owner is an affiliate of a foreign registrant, even though the literal
language of the statute requires Customs to stop any goods bearing a
valid United States trademark from entering the country without the
written consent of the domestic trademark owner.13 Firms opposing gray
market importation have attempted to circumvent the effect of the
K Mart holding using theories arising out of sales, 14 trademark,15 and
copyright 16 law. For differing reasons, the first two methods have, at least
partially, failed. t7
The law of sales makes an ineffective tool because of the good faith
requirements of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).1 8 Although
most gray retailers know that a manufacturer does not wish to see its
wares sold outside authorized distribution channels, 19 a court will enjoin
the sale of gray market goods only if the end retailer possesses actual
knowledge that the goods originally were procured through a fraudulent
representation regarding the point of sale.2" The difficulty of proving this
actual knowledge makes a UCC-based attack on gray market practices
unfeasible.21
Trademark law, however, allows Customs to stop gray market goods at
Except as provided in subsection (d) of this section, it shall be unlawful to import
into the United States any merchandise of foreign manufacture if such merchan-
dise... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation or associa-
tion created or organized within, the United States... unless written consent of
the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 526(a) (1994).
13. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 294; 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(2) (1995) (allowing the importation
of goods bearing a United States trademark if the domestic mark holder shares common
control with the foreign registrant).
14. See Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 789 F.2d 100 (3d Cir.
1986) (describing Johnson & Johnson's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to use the UCC to
prevent parallel importation); infra notes 32-42 and accompanying text (discussing the
Johnson & Johnson case in detail).
15. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 287-88; Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia,
Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1992).
16. See generally Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts
(PTY), Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988); Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
17. See infra notes 32-42 (discussing the shortcomings of the UCC as a weapon against
the gray market) and notes 88-109 (discussing the shortcomings of trademark law as a
weapon against the gray market); cf. infra notes 119-41 and accompanying text (describing
the comparative appeal of copyright law to address gray market imports).
18. See Johnson & Johnson, 789 F.2d at 104.
19. Id. at 103.
20. Id. at 106.
21. See id. (stating that, in contrast, subjective suspicion of a fraud in the chain of title
could create a voidable title in the purchaser); see also Doris R. Perl, Comment, The Use of
[Vol. 45:561
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the border if they bear a "material difference" from those sold in the
United States.22 A product destined for sale abroad may have very dif-
ferent characteristics than one sold under the same mark domestically.23
This difference may surprise the consumer and harm the brand's reputa-
tion in the United States market.24
The judicially created "material difference" standard provides a sub-
stantial, but ultimately defective shield against the gray market.2 5 The
reason for enforcing trademark rights disappears if the gray goods are
physically identical to those sold by the United States trademark owners,
as the consumer will neither be confused as to the product's source, nor
disappointed by the product's characteristics. 26 'Second, the administra-
tion of the materially different standard may impose a practical burden
Copyright Law to Block the Importation of Gray-Market Goods: The Black and White of It
All, 23 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 645, 648 (1990) (discussing the Johnson & Johnson case).
22. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d at 633, 638 (1st
Cir. 1992); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1332-33 (1st Cir. 1991). Cus-
toms recently has received commentary on the promulgation of regulations implementing
the Nestle and Lever decisions, see infra note 27 (discussing the proposed language), but,
according to the opinion, material difference has to be determined on a facts and circum-
stances basis. Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641. Thus, Customs faces a large administrative burden-
these decisions may be impossible to practically implement. Cf infra notes 87-103 and
accompanying text (discussing the analysis used to determine whether an import infringes
§ 42 of the Lanham Act).
23. See, e.g., Lever Bros., 981 F.2d at 1331 (describing how soap destined for sale in
Great Britain produces less lather than soap intended for sale in the United States); Pep-
siCo, Inc. v. Nostalgia Prods. Corp., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1404,1405 (N.D. 11. 1990) (illus-
trating differences in the packaging and formula of Pepsicola destined for sale abroad); cf
El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395-96 (2d Cir. 1986)
(showing how an unauthorized import may differ from the domestic enough to make it a
counterfeit article), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
24. See also Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc. 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1241-49
(D.N.J.) (finding a one-half calorie difference between a gray market breath mint and its
domestic counterpart to be material), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 952 F.2d 44 (3d. Cir. 1991); Appalachian Art Works v. Granada Elec., Inc., 816
F.2d 68, 70, 73 (2d Cir.) (describing how Cabbage Patch dolls made by a Spanish licensee
had "adoption papers" in Spanish and did not provide for "birthday card" delivery, as
compared to the U.S. distributor), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987); Dial Corp. v. Encina
Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951, 952 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (holding small differences in soap ingredients
to be material).
25. See discussion infra notes 123-41 and accompanying text (discussing Ipw trade-
mark law is designed to prevent consumer confusion, and how that confusion will not exist
when the goods are identical).
26. See, e.g., Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 687 (3d Cir.) (declin-
ing to grant a remedy for trademark infringement where both the gray market good and its
domestic counterpart were identical and when the trademark holder was a subsidiary of a
foreign corporation), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); NEC Elec. v. CAL Circuits Abco,
810 F.2d 1506, 1511 (9th Cir.) (stating that the parallel importation of a good does not
infringe United States trademark rights), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987).
Catholic University Law Review
on Customs that the agency cannot feasibly meet.27
Copyright law appears to present a much more effective sword; § 602
prohibits the importation of a copyrighted work without the consent of
the owner.28 Juxtaposed against that provision, however, is the limitation
of the "first sale" doctrine contained in § 109(a) of the Act, which pro-
vides that upon the transfer of a copyrighted work, the copyright holder
no longer controls future transfers of the item.29 The question presented
to the courts in the gray market context is whether the first sale doctrine
prevents a manufacturer from obtaining relief against a gray marketer in
an infringement suit, even if the first sale occurred abroad. Existing case
law has not yielded a uniform answer.30 This Comment favors protecting
manufacturers and their distributors from gray marketing via the Copy-
right Act.
First, this Comment examines the utility of sales and trademark law to
fight the gray market, and the shortcomings of each, focusing on the im-
plications of the Supreme Court's decision in K Mart v. Cartier.3 This
Comment then explains the allure of copyright law as a weapon in fight-
ing the sale of gray market goods. It next reviews the present state of
copyright case law, particularly the analytical division between the Third
27. See Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 641 (1st
Cir. 1992) (stating that the reviewing court is concerned with "subtle differences"). The
Coalition to Protect the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), which represents
the anti-gray market manufacturers, recently proposed a rule to Customs that would bar
goods possessing "demonstrable difference in the pre- or post-sale characteristics or treat-
ment." Outline: COPIAT Legal Seminar, COPIAT NEWS, Nov. 1994, at 6. The status of
this language remains undetermined as of this writing. Id. at 7.
28. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994). Section 602 states that "[i]mportation into the United
States, without the authority of the owner of copyright ... of copies or phonorecords of a
work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106."
29. Id. § 109(a). Section 109 expressly limits the distribution right conveyed by
§ 106(3). Section 109(a) states that "... the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord
lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without
the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
copy .... "
30. See, e.g., Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding that § 109 only extinguishes the distribution right attached to copies
made and sold in the United States), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); BMG Music v.
Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319-21 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding similarly), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206
(1992); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd. 847 F.2d 1093, 1095-97 (3d
Cir. 1988) (denying plaintiff the protection of § 602); Neutrogena Corp. v. United States, 7
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900,1901-04 (D.S.C. 1988) (denying a preliminary injunction based on
§ 602); Selchow & Righter Corp. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19, 22-23, 25 (S.D. Fla.
1985) (enjoining the sale of Canadian Trivial Pursuit games).
31. 486 U.S. 281, 292-95 (1987) (upholding Customs regulations allowing the importa-
tion of goods bearing a trademark held by a domestic affiliate of the foreign
manufacturer).
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and Ninth Circuits in their methods of reconciling § 109 and § 602 of the
Copyright Act. Finally, after reviewing the legislative history of each pro-
vision, this Comment concludes that the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, which
does not allow sale of a work abroad to exhaust the United States
owner's right to prevent its importation, is more sound, and may well
spur the demise of the gray market.
I. LEGAL APPROACHES TAKEN TO COMBAT THE GRAY MARKET
A. The Failure of the Uniform Commercial Code to Prevent the Sale
of Gray Market Goods
United States trademark owners cannot rely upon the law of sales to
challenge the practices of a gray market retailer unless they can prove
that the end retailer actually knew that the goods were purchased fraudu-
lently.32 In Johnson & Johnson v. DAL International Trading,33 the plain-
tiff sold toothbrushes to DAL, a Polish government corporation, solely
for distribution in Poland.34 Johnson & Johnson shortly learned, how-
ever, that the goods traveled back into the United States and were on sale
at a discount health and beauty chain, Quality King.35 The District Court
32. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1986).
33. 798 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
34. Id. at 101. The contract itself was not a sale of goods for cash. Because of the
volatility of Polish currency, Johnson & Johnson arranged a barter transaction between
DAL and a third company, Wendexim. Id. Johnson & Johnson would ship the goods to
DAL, who in turn would send lumber to Wendexim. Id. Wendexim ultimately paid John-
son & Johnson in cash for the cost of the goods. Id.; cf. supra note 2 (describing the effect
of changing currency rates on gray market importation).
35. Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 102. DAL made the purchase order over the
phone in March of 1985, and Johnson & Johnson executed a written contract in April, and
delivered the goods in June. Id. Between March and June, however, a third person had
learned of the good's availability on the market and informed Quality King. Id.
The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania addressed whether Quality
King qualified as a good faith purchaser under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and
therefore acquired valid title to the goods at issue. Id. at 103; see U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (1989)
(describing the UCC's procedure for acquiring valid title); see also U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b)
(defining good faith as "honesty in fact" and the observance of reasonable commercial
standards in the trade). According to the court below, the circumstances surrounding the
transaction "cried out for inquiry." Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 103 (quoting the dis-
trict court opinion, and noting that the goods' abnormally low price should have made
Quality King suspicious).
Quality King's vice president prepared a purchase order for the goods while Johnson &
Johnson negotiated the specifics of the transaction with DAL. Id. at 102. Furthermore, he
also knew that Johnson & Johnson would not voluntarily place their goods on the gray
market. Id. at 103. Under these circumstances, the lower court concluded that Quality
King suspected that the goods were acquired from Johnson & Johnson by fraud, and thus
the defendant did not meet the UCC's definition of good faith purchaser. Id. at 102-03.
1996]
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for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoined Quality King from sell-
ing the toothbrushes.
3 6
In vacating the lower court's injunction for the plaintiff, the Third Cir-
cuit noted that, given the nature of the gray trade, the end retailer proba-
bly knew that a manufacturer has no intention of retailing his goods at
deflated prices.37 This general knowledge, however, imposed no duty on
the end retailer to examine the chain of title to determine whether the
presence of fraud exists. 38 The court then stated that the imposition of an
affirmative duty to investigate would frustrate the goals of the UCC,
namely, the reduction of transaction costs. 39 Accordingly, the court could
not conclude that Quality King knew of DAL's misrepresentations or
willfully blinded itself to the truth.4"
Had Johnson & Johnson prevailed, the gray market would have suf-
fered greatly; a territorial distribution clause in the contract of sale and a
well-drafted complaint easily could have led to an injunction barring the
sale of these goods.41 Instead, the purchaser met the UCC's good faith
Had no knowledge of the fraud been pled, the transfer of title from DAL to Quality King
would have been entirely valid. Id. at 103 n.2; see also U.C.C. § 2-403(1). The District
Court enjoined Quality King from future sales. Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 103.
Had Johnson & Johnson won, the title to the goods would have reverted to DAL. Id.
DAL acquired voidable title because it arguably committed a fraud when purchasing them;
thus, Johnson & Johnson would have regained title to the goods. See id.
36. Id. at 102.
37. Id. at 103.
38. Id. at 105-06. Interestingly, the court noted that a duty to investigate could have
been created out of commercial practice pursuant to the definition of good faith in § 2-
103(1)(b) as "'the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade.' " Id. at 106 n.4 (quoting U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b)). "[T]he evidence suggested that this
was not normally done," however, and the burden of production of custom would have
rested on Johnson & Johnson. Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 106 n.4. In fact, it is the
practice in this line of business to conceal the chain of title as much as possible; in this case,
by ripping the original shipping labels off of the cartons. Id. at 102. Ironically, although
the court's holding advances the policy goal of reducing transaction costs, it also licenses an
ostrich mentality on the part of the retailer.
39. Id. at 104; see also U.C.C. § 1-102 (defining the purpose of the code).
40. Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 103; see also RONALD A. ANDERSON, 1 ANDER-
SON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 378-85 (3d ed. 1981) (noting that under the
UCC, mere negligence does not equate bad faith). If "the subsequent purchaser lacks
good faith, however, he acquires only the seller's voidable title and may be required to
surrender the goods to the defrauded party." Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 102.
41. See Johnson & Johnson, 798 F.2d at 103. In Johnson & Johnson, the Third Circuit
accepted the lower court's conclusion that the plaintiff would not welcome Quality King's
distribution of their products, and that Quality King was aware of this fact. Id. The Third
Circuit explicitly rejected the District Court's conclusion that the gray market practice of
intentionally obscuring the chain of title amounted to bad faith. Cf. id. at 103-04 (also
stating that, if this rule were accepted, the acquisition of goods at an unusually low price
could trigger an inference of bad faith).
Under the District Court construction, if a retailer knows that a manufacturer probably
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standard and acquired valid title because he had a " 'pure heart and...
empty head.' ,42 Johnson & Johnson prevents the trademark owner from
being able to use the original contract of sale as a basis for preventing the
later disposition of gray market goods.
B. The Use of Tariff and Trademark Law to Combat Gray Market
Goods and the Importance of Material Difference
1. The Relationship Between the Purpose and Function of
Trademarks and the Gray Market
Trademarks are words, symbols, or devices that distinguish products
from a particular source from those of another.4 3 Unlike copyright pro-
tection, which arises from an explicit grant of constitutional authority,"
federal trademark legislation springs from Congress' general constitu-
tional power to regulate commerce among the several states. 45 Trade-
does not wish his goods to be sold by that retailer, he must investigate as a matter of law.
Id. Thus, a plaintiff would only have to demonstrate the removal of shipping labels and the
presence of an abnormally low price at which the unauthorized retailer acquired the goods.
Id. The pleading of all of these facts could lead to an injunction and the eventual return of
the unsold gray goods to the manufacturer.
42. Id. at 106.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942) (describing a trademark as a "merchandising short-cut
which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to believe he
wants"); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412-14 (1916) (noting that a
trademark associates a product and its manufacturer); see also William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-
70 (1987) (describing a trademark as a shorthand mechanism to distinguish goods or serv-
ices on the market).
44. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress shall have the power "[tlo pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries"); see infra notes
110-11 (discussing the history of this constitutional provision).
45. In re Trade-mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93-95 (1879). Unlike a copyright, which vests
in the author at the time he creates his work, trademark rights accrue only when the mark
is used in commerce. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 6.01[2] (3d ed. 1995). Failure to use the mark can result in the abandon-
ment of any rights that may have accrued. Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40,45 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 907 (1989).
A trademark is also territorial-its goodwill can only be protected within a confined
regional market. A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260
U.S. 689 (1923) (Hough, J., dissenting) (stating that "a trade mark is primarily a protection
to the owner's business. It is attached to the business, is a part of it, and cannot be de-
tached therefrom .... [the parallel importation of the] genuine article has become an
infringement because the business of dealing in that article within the United States is the
plaintiff's business"). See also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98
(1918) (describing the operation of the territoriality principle within the United States);
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959) (illustrating
its operation in cases where the mark has always been registered). The territoriality of
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mark rights facilitate commerce in two ways. First, by attributing a
product's origin to a specific manufacturer, it provides an incentive for
the producer to maintain the quality of its goods.46 Second, trademarks
make market transactions more efficient by reducing consumer search
CoStS.
47
The sale of a good on the gray market can harm the goodwill embodied
in an owner's trademark in a number of ways. First, the gray market
retailer may not offer services that lend to a brand's favorable percep-
48 mretion. Many gray market retailers make their sale based almost entirely
on price and expend little effort advertising the brand name or maintain-
ing its image.49 A consumer may purchase a good believing the manufac-
turer will guarantee its performance, only to find that, when it breaks, no
recourse exists.51 Second, in addition to service-based differences be-
trademark rights also has been recognized as a matter of international law. Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, art. 6(3), 21 U.S.T. 1630, 1639
(confining the enforcement of trademark rights to the country in which the mark is
registered).
46. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, at § 201[2][a].
47. Id.; see also Landes and Posner, supra note 43, at 268-70 (describing how the use
of a trademark as a shorthand in the marketplace decreases transaction costs). But see
Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV.
809, 816-17 (1935) (arguing that protecting words via trademark statutes unnecessarily
removes language from circulation).
48. Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); COLLADO
STUDY, supra note 3, at 26 (describing the lack of warranty service that can accompany
some gray goods).
49. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp at 1166 (stating that the advertisements for gray market
camera equipment generally consist of a one line price quote); cf LEXECON STUDY, supra
note 5, at 43 (stating that a distributor with a long term interest in maintaining brand
reputation will be more likely to invest in proper shipping, storage, and inventory control).
Indeed, the proclivity of businesses to engage in price arbitrage creates the gray market.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the effect of currency fluctuation,
among other factors, on parallel importation). In order for the parallel importer to maxi-
mize its profits, brand advertising must be kept to a minimum. LEXECON STUDY, supra
note 5, at 59 (Illustration 2).
As a corollary, the gray market retailer depends on the marketing investments of the
authorized distributor. Cf id. at 27 (stating that gray market importing centers around
products with strong trademarks); Hansen, supra note 2, at 252, 254 (stating that gray mar-
keters free ride on the marketing investments of authorized distributors). Opponents of
the gray market assert that this free riding harms consumers because, as the gray market
grows in force, the distributor will have less incentive to develop a market for products
vulnerable to parallel importation. LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 29-30.
50. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1167; Senate Hearing on S. 626, supra note 3, at 512-13
(statement of Linda F. Goldoner, Executive Director, National Consumers League) (list-
ing excerpts from consumer correspondence complaining of the lack of warranty service
accompanying gray market watches and camera equipment); Desiree French, Ruling Seen
as Boon to Consumers: Gray Market Purchases Saved Customers Estimated $3 to $4 Bil-
lion, BOSTON GLOBE, June 1, 1988, at 63 (stating that many gray market goods do not
come with warranties, but, in some cases, the gray retailer issues its own; in other cases the
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tween gray market and authorized goods, the gray good may differ physi-
cally from that sold by an authorized distributor.51 Evidence also exists
that counterfeit goods are often mixed with gray market goods, facilitat-
ing their importation.52 Finally, the appearance of goods in discount out-
consumer is simply "lost"). Some state statutes, however, legislatively ameliorate the harm
to the consumer. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 1797.8(2)(1), (2) (Deering 1994) (requir-
ing, for example, the gray marketer to notify the consumer if the item does not conform to
United States voltage requirements or is not covered by the manufacturers warranty); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 218-aa(3)(b) (McKinney 1988) (requiring retailer to inform the con-
sumer when the instructions are not in English).
51. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 635 (1st Cir.
1992) (finding a difference between Venezuela-bound Perugina chocolate and that des-
tined for the United States); Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 102-03 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (finding Sunlight dish soap intended for sale in Great Britain materially different
from that intended for sale in the United States); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v.
Granada Elec., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (finding a material difference when gray
market Cabbage patch dolls came with Spanish instructions, and the seller would not pro-
cess the "adoption papers" and send birthday cards to the end purchaser), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 847 (1987).
Differences in quality tend to manifest itself most acutely when a foreign licensee manu-
factured the gray market good. See The Luxury-Goods Trade, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 12,
1992, at 98 (noting how Pierre Cardin had its U.S. sales destroyed by the parallel importa-
tion of licensee-manufactured products). More serious differences between the gray good
and the genuine article may exist, however. For example, 50,000 units of gray market Oil
of Olay were pulled off of the shelves because they contained Red Dye # 2, which is legal
in Canada but not in the United States. Senate Hearing on S. 626, supra note 3, at 522
(Statement of the National Council of Senior Citizens). Another case involved the impor-
tation of fluoride toothpaste into the United States intended for countries without fluoride
in their water supply. Id. at 522-23. This toothpaste is potentially dangerous to consumers
of a fluoridated water supply. Id. Other flaws in gray market goods may include errone-
ous or incomplete ingredient lists. Id. at 523; see also id. at 440 (documenting the Food and
Drug Administration's recall of gray market Johnson & Johnson baby shampoo and sun-
block for failure to list the ingredients properly).
52. See Senate Hearing on S. 626, supra note 3, at 62-63 (statement of Rep. Cardin); id.
at 86 (statement of Christopher Edley, Jr., President, Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of
American Trademarks (COPIAT)) (quoting a policeman's affidavit stating that " 'the gray
market is a tremendous boon to counterfeiters' "). According to the affidavit, gray market
imports provide a perfect cover for counterfeits because Customs may let them into the
country if they appear similar to the gray good. Id. Furthermore, the intermingled goods
allow retailers to argue that they thought that the illegal counterfeits were merely gray
imports. Id.
COPIAT hired a private investigator to determine whether any connection existed be-
tween gray market imports and counterfeiting. Letter from T.M. Huhn, Huhn and Associ-
ates to Emilio Collado, COPIAT, July 3, 1989, at 2 in Brief of the National Consumers
League, the Food and Allied Service Trades Department, AFL-CIO, and the Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks as Amicus Curiae, Appendix B, Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994) (92-56,359; 92-55,050),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995). The investigator concluded that a "significant linkage"
existed, id. at 1-2, and cited a number of instances, including that of the fluoride tooth-
paste, supra note 51, as among the more egregious evidence of a connection. The investi-
gator found gray market goods intermingled with substantial amounts of counterfeits in the
area of video game boards, id. at 2-4, cosmetics, id. at 3, and auto parts, id. at 2, 4.
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lets may tarnish the image that the brand has sought to develop and
protect.53
The gray market also may harm the integrity of American markets in
the long run.5 4 The presence of unauthorized goods in the United States
The letter noted, however, that its findings were "by no means comprehensive," due to
the short period of time that the investigator had to complete his investigation. Id. at 2. In
addition, some law enforcement officials would not talk to him because they were in the
process of investigation pending indictment. Id.
53. The harm suffered by the trademark owner in this regard is akin to the harm
caused by trademark dilution, which occurs when a likelihood of injury to the business
reputation or distinctiveness of a mark exists notwithstanding an absence of consumer con-
fusion. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 368d (McKinney 1988); see also ILL. ANN. STAT § 1035/15
(Smith Hurd 1993) (defining dilution similarly). State dilution statutes prevent the loss of
a trademark's distinctiveness by prohibiting its use by another on an unrelated product.
See, e.g., Ringling Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v. Celozzi-Ettelson
Chevrolet, Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 482-84 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding that a car dealership's use of
the phrase "The Greatest Used Car Show on Earth" in a fashion designed to evoke
thoughts of a circus violated the Illinois dilution statute, and stating that unlike the often
measurable injury caused by confusion, " 'dilution ... if allowed to spread, will eventually
destroy the advertising value of the mark' ") (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319
F.2d 830, 836 (7th Cir. 1963)). Liability under a dilution statute does not exist in the gray
market context because the trademark is genuine. See supra note 1 and accompanying text
(defining gray goods). However, to the extent that a brand's reputation is tied directly to
an exclusive image, it suffers the same type of harm from its ubiquitous appearance in
unauthorized outlets. Cf The Luxury Goods Trade, supra note 51, at 98 (noting "though
styles may change, snobbery is forever"); MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.14[3] (describing
"irrational" consumer choices). Luxury items thus will suffer most from gray market im-
portation because the brand conveys a certain sense of style, see The Luxury Goods Trade,
supra note 51, at 98, and, more practically, because they tend to carry a high level of value
relative to their weight. Hansen, supra note 2, at 252 (stating that the gray market tends to
involve goods with a high value relative to weight); LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 11,
14; COLLADO STUDY, supra note 3, at 10-11 (describing the gray marketer's dependence
on the domestic marketer's advertising). In the long run, the appearance of a bottle of
expensive perfume in a discount outlet will undercut the exclusive image from which these
goods derive their value. For a discussion of state trademark dilution statutes and their
relation with traditional trademark concepts, see generally David S. Welkowitz, Reexamin-
ing Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531 (1991); Elizabeth C. Bannon, Revisiting
"The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection: Control of Quality and Dilution - Es-
tranged Bedfellows?, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 65 (1990).
54. See Beyers, supra note 1, at 109-15; Shira R. Yoshor, Comment, Competing in the
Shadowy Gray: Protecting Domestic Trademark Holders from Gray Marketeers Under the
Lanham Act, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363, 1380-90 (1992); LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at
47 (stating that gray market goods harm consumers when the gray good is inferior to the
authorized one, when it fails to meet expectations, and when the harm to the brand's mar-
ket reputation causes the United States trademark owner to cut costs in marketing or in
maintaining the product's quality). But see Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Customs
Service, 575 F. Supp. 416, 419 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (noting that, although the domestic mark
owner expended considerable funds in marketing the name "Oscar de la Renta," the place-
ment of its goods into the international stream of commerce forfeited the protection of the
trademark laws to insulate itself from the practices of its distribution network and, further-
more, that the parent company had already been paid for the gray imports and therefore
no legal remedy exists).
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market inflates supply.5 Accordingly, it lowers the price that consumers
are willing to pay in authorized outlets, causing a diminished profit mar-
gin for the manufacturer. 6 While this pressure may result in increased
efficiency, it also may encourage the manufacturer to produce a more
cheaply made product.5 7 When it forces the manufacturer to do so, the
gray market undercuts one of the primary functions of the trademark sys-
tem: the production of quality goods. 8
2. Customs Regulations and Identical Goods
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 explicitly prohibits the importa-
tion of goods bearing a valid United States trademark without the written
consent of the United States trademark owner. 9 In the 1970s, however,
Customs administratively created broad exceptions to the statute.
60
These regulatory exceptions allow goods bearing a valid United States
trademark to enter the country without the domestic markholder's con-
In addition, United States trademark owners assert that as an economic matter, when a
different product is sold with a genuine trademark, the gray market retailer suffers almost
no damage, as his share of the market will measure substantially less than that of the dis-
tributor. LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 44-45. The gray retailer, therefore, has no
vested economic interest in maintaining the product's market reputation. Id. at 45.
55. E.g., LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 45 (describing the harm to the distributor
from the presence of the gray good in the domestic market).
56. See id. at 59 (Illustration 2) (demonstrating in table format the incentives of the
gray market retailer as opposed to those of the manufacturer); cf K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 317 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting that if the trademark
owner wants to prevent losses from parallel importation of a licensee's products, it may
always terminate the licensing agreement).
57. See LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 47 (stating that the United States trademark
owner may cease investing in the maintenance of product quality as a result of gray market
sales); Senate Hearing on S. 626, supra note 3, at 137, 147 (statement of Carol Tucker
Foreman) (arguing that gray market sales may lead to fewer products on the market and
higher prices); see generally J. MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVER-
HEAD CosTs 59-64 (1923) (describing the nature of selling costs and their relationship with
production).
58. See MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.01[2][a] (describing the effect of trademarks on
the producer's incentive to maintain quality); Landes and Posner, supra note 43, at 268-72
(describing the incentives created by trademarks similarly).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994). An issue may exist as to whether § 526 constitutes a
tariff or a trademark statute. Compare Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1557-
60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding the Customs regulations, but claiming jurisdiction over the
interpretation of this provision because the injunction sought did not involve an infringe-
ment as such, but related to the propriety of the Customs' enforcement), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1055 (1986) with Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United
States, 790 F.2d 903, 904-05 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding general federal question jurisdiction
in actions relating to trademarks), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
60. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 312. Between 1959 and 1972, the language of the Customs
regulations mirrored that of § 526. Id. at 311.
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sent if: (1) the United States and the foreign trademark are owned by the
same entity; (2) the United States and the foreign mark holders are sub-
ject to "common control"; or (3) the goods bear a mark applied "under
authorization of the U.S. owner."
61
In K Mart v. Cartier,62 the Supreme Court considered whether these
regulations constituted a proper construction of section 526.63 The Court
assumed that the parallel imports perfectly mirrored those sold by the
American trademark owner.6' In a divided opinion, the Court struck
down the "authorized use" exemption, but left the "same entity" and
common control exemptions standing.65 As a result, American trade-
mark owners must find less direct means of keeping gray goods out of the
61. Id. at 289-90 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1987)). The current Customs
regulations, promulgated at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1995) provide that:
b) Identical trademark. Foreign-made articles bearing a trademark identical with
one owned and recorded by a citizen of the United States or a corporation or
association created or organized within the United States are subject to seizure
and forfeiture as prohibited importations.
c) Restrictions not applicable. The restrictions set forth in paragraphs (a) and (b)
of this section do not apply to imported articles when:
(1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade name are owned by the
same person or business entity;
(2) The foreign and domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent
and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or
control ....
The regulations also state that if the above provisions are violated, the offending articles
will be detained for 30 days, during which the importer may show that they meet one of the
exceptions. 19 C.F.R. § 133.22(a). The failure to do so will cause Customs to institute
forfeiture proceedings. Id. § 133.22(c).
Customs has defined "common control" as the existence of any relationship that allows
one company to share effective control over the policy and operations of another. 19
C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(2). The companies do not need to share common ownership. Id.
62. 486 U.S. 281 (1987).
63. Id. at 291. The Court granted certiorari to resolve conflicts between the Courts of
Appeals. Id. at 290. Compare Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1557-60 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (upholding the
Customs regulations, but claiming jurisdiction over the interpretation of this provision be-
cause the injunction sought did not involve an infringement as such, but related to the
propriety of the Customs Service Enforcement), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1988) with
Olympus Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 317-19 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the regula-
tions as a reasonable construction of § 526), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988) and Coali-
tion to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks, 790 F.2d at 907-08 (striking the Customs
regulations as an unreasonable interpretation of § 526).
64. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 290 n.3 (declining to address the interaction between the
Customs regulations and § 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994), which bars the
importation of products bearing trademarks that copy or simulate those of a United States
trademark owner). The congruity of the Customs regulations with § 42 formed the issue
addressed in Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see also infra
notes 88-109 and accompanying text (describing the legal theories behind the Lever line of
cases in greater detail).
65. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 293-94.
[Vol. 45:561
1996] Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law
domestic market.66
The K Mart Court envisioned gray market importation as occurring in
one of three situations.67 In the first scenario, an independent domestic
firm buys the right to use a trademark in the United States from a foreign
company only to find the foreign company itself importing the same
goods into the country, thereby resulting in competition with the domes-
tic trademark owner.68 In the second case, the foreign trademark owner,
its domestic subsidiary, or other United States entity related to the for-
eign trademark owner, registers the trademark in the United States.69
66. See discussion infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text (discussing the use of § 42
of the Lanham Act to prevent importation when the goods are "materially different") and
notes 135-92 (discussing the use of copyright law to prevent importation when no differ-
ence exists).
67. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286.
68. Id.; see generally A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 539-40 (2d. Cir.
1921) (describing a situation in which the plaintiff bought exclusive distribution rights for
foreign face powder only to find the face powder on sale at a competing retailer), rev'd,
260 U.S. 689 (1923).
69. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286. This scenario forms the basis for the "same entity" and
"common control" exemptions. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1), (2) (1995) (allowing the im-
portation of goods bearing a valid United States trademark if the domestic trademark
owner is either the same entity or shares common control with the foreign trademark regis-
trant). In some cases, a foreign firm wishing to distribute its wares in the United States will
incorporate a domestic subsidiary, and then register its trademark in the subsidiary's name.
K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286; see also supra note 3 (describing the ubiquitousness of this corpo-
rate arrangement in the gray market context). Alternatively, however, an American com-
pany may create a manufacturing subsidiary abroad. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286. If the
products sold abroad by the manufacturing parent or the subsidiaries are imported into the
United States, a gray market appears. Id. at 287; see also supra note 1 and accompanying
text (defining the gray market).
In the United States, registration of a trademark gives the owner an exclusive privilege
to use that mark. Natural Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1395
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985). Until recently, a United States trademark
owner could only register a trademark after using it in commerce. See Blue Bell, Inc. v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (5th Cir. 1975) (requiring that, in order to receive
registration, a trademark must be actually used in commerce and internal shipments do not
qualify as use within the meaning of the Lanham Act), superseded by statute, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b) (1994). Treaty obligations, however, required the U.S. to register a foreign
trademark even if the foreign company's registration requirements differed drastically
from those in the United States. See 15 U.S.C. § 1126(b), (d) (1994) (requiring the Patent
and Trademark Office to register marks and extend the protection of the Lanham Act to
any business that has registered a trademark in a country party to the same trademark
agreements as the United States); Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 6(3). Thus, a for-
eign entity could register its trademark abroad in a country without a use requirement, and
then register the mark in the United States market. S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess.
5 (1988) (noting that foreign applicants could register the mark in the United States
notwithstanding lack of use of the mark anywhere else). Although the judicially created
"token use" doctrine eased the burden on American businesses, see generally Fort Howard
Paper Co. v. Kimberly-Clark Co., 390 F.2d 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1968) (holding that a sale of
forty cases of toilet tissues and two hundred cases of facial tissue constituted enough use to
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The importation of these goods into the United States by someone other
than an entity related to the foreign trademark owner creates a gray mar-
ket.7" In the third scenario, the domestic markholder licenses the use of
its mark in a specific region abroad, only to find the goods reappearing on
the gray market.71 A majority of the justices agreed, albeit for differing
reasons, that the statute only allows Customs to admit goods in the sec-
ond scenario.72
Justice Scalia, concurring in part and dissenting in part, asserted that
the plain language of the statute nullified all three exceptions, and there-
fore inquiry into the legislative history was unnecessary. 73 Accordingly,
all three of the exceptions contained in the Customs regulations exceeded
support a trademark registration), the use requirement nonetheless put American busi-
nesses at a competitive disadvantage. See S. REP. No. 515, supra, at 6 (stating that
although the token use doctrine eased competitive burdens for some businesses, it could
not address the concerns of service industries such as banks, or others involving large and
expensive products such as airplanes). In 1988, Congress amended the Lanham Act to
allow American businesses to register their marks by demonstrating a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce. P.L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1051(b) (1994)).
70. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 286-87.
71. Id. at 287. Generally, the domestic trademark owner sells a foreign manufacturer
the exclusive right to use its trademark in a United States location, conditioned on the
foreign licensee's promise not to import its goods into the United States. Id. If the licen-
see imports its goods, it creates a gray market. Id.
72. Id. at 294; see, e.g., id. at 302 (Brennan, J., concurring) (finding the common con-
trol exemption a reasonable agency interpretation of § 526, and also finding that the for-
eign parent may prevent gray market importation through contractual means); id. at 291-
94 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing the common control and same entity exceptions
as permissible constructions due to the ambiguity in the statute); id. at 294 (finding the
creation of an authorized-use exception an impermissible construction of § 526). Justice
Scalia would have struck all three exemptions because of their conflict with the plain lan-
guage of the statute; see id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
73. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 318-29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
construing the language of the Tariff Act, the majority first looked to its plain language,
which, at first glance, seems to offer little room for the Customs interpretation. Id. at 291.
The Act states:
... [I]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a citi-
zen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United
States, and registered in the Patent and Trademark Office by a person domiciled
in the United States . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1995).
Justice Scalia noted that the statutory language requiring the trademark to be "owned
by" an American entity is ambiguous because some question may exist as to whether a
foreign parent, by owning a domestic subsidiary, actually owns the mark. K Mart, 486 U.S.
at 319 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That ambiguity becomes irrele-
vant, however, because the mark's ownership resides in a domestic entity regardless of the
locus of the parent. Id.
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the bureau's statutory authority.74
Justice Kennedy, on the other hand, found ambiguity in the phrase
"goods of foreign manufacture," claiming that the term could mean
goods manufactured abroad, goods made by a foreign company, or goods
manufactured abroad by a foreign company. 75 Given this alleged ambi-
guity in the statute, Justice Kennedy ,found Customs' construction of the
statutory language with regard to the common control and same entity
exemptions reasonable.76 The statute's categorical exclusion of goods of
"foreign manufacture," however, could not support the "authorized use"
exception.77
Although Justice Kennedy's brief concurrence provided a substantive
rationale for the Court's holding,78 Justice Brennan's concurrence pro-
vides greater insight into the Court's reasoning in upholding the common
control exceptions. 79 Analyzing the statute's language, Justice Brennan
found that the phrase goods of "foreign manufacture" could refer either
to goods manufactured abroad or goods made by a foreign company.
80
In order to resolve that ambiguity, he looked to the legislative history of
section 526.81 Justice Brennan concluded that Congress intended section
526 to prohibit the importation of genuine goods in one specific case, that
of the independent United States business that buys a trademark from a
foreign manufacturer, only to find the manufacturer importing the goods
into the United States market.82
74. Id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. Id. at 292. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also found some ambiguity
in the phrase regarding ownership. Id. If a wholly owned subsidiary of a foreign corpora-
tion holds title to the U.S. mark, the issue is whether the foreign corporation owned the
mark by owning the subsidiary. Id. If so, then the goods fall outside the protection of the
statute. Id.
76. Id. at 292-93.
77. Id. at 293-94; id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 292-93.
79. See id. at 295-317 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
80. Id. at 299.
81. See id. at 304-08.
82. Id. at 302-03 (concluding that Katzel provided the "major stimulus" for the enact-
ment of § 526); see also id. at 307 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1223, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. 158 (1922)); A. Bourjois and Co. v. Katzel, 275 F. 539, 543 (2d
Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); see generally 62 CONG. REC. 11,585-604 (1922) (evi-
dencing Congress' intent to protect the United States trademark owner in this situation).
In codifying the decision, Congress attempted to protect the territoriality of trademarks.
Judge Hough of the Second Circuit (whose views the Supreme Court followed) summed up
the doctrine nicely by noting that "a trade-mark [sic] is primarily a protection to the
owner's business. It is attached to the business, is a part of it, and cannot be detached
therefrom .... [The] genuine article has become an infringement because the business of
dealing in that article within the United States is the plaintiff's business." Katzel, 275 F. at
543-44.
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Despite American trademark owners' assertion that the statute should
be read literally and allow no unauthorized importations, the "common
control" exception survived.83 Although the Court's holding in K Mart
Justice Brennan decried Justice Scalia's plain language approach as resting on the flawed
assumption that Congress had clearly expressed its intent. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 315. In
Justice Brennan's view, when postenactment development presents an uncertain implica-
tion of the statute's purpose, the Court should evaluate the extent to which the purpose of
the statute would be furthered by following its directives in a new situation. See id. at 315-
16 (drawing a parallel between deciding the issue in K Mart to determining the proper
application of a 19th century statute requiring the inspection of ovens that may spew
flames to modern microwave appliances). Analogizing to § 526, he argued that the review-
ing court should examine to what degree the change in the conceptualization of trademark
ownership from universal to territorial has implicated the statute's purposes. Id. at 316-17.
On this theory, Justice Brennan asserted that Congress intended § 526 only to remedy
the inequity created in Katzel. Id. at 307. There, the plaintiff had bought the exclusive
rights to sell face powder in the United States from a French manufacturer. Katzel, 275 F.
at 539. The powder was manufactured in France, but boxed and retailed by an American
company. Id. The French company continued to import the face powder and sell it in
competition with that sold by the American business. Id. at 540. In upholding the right of
the French company to sell the goods in the United States, the Second Circuit reasoned
that because the good sold under the French trademark and the United States trademark
came from the same source, there can be no infringement. Id. The Supreme Court, in
overturning the Second Circuit, found that a trademark is territorial, and that it protects its
owner's goodwill in a specific market. Katzel, 260 U.S. at 692.
By the same token, Justice Brennan would have upheld the authorized use exception, 19
C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1987), on the theory that the concept of territoriality in trademark
rights had not developed cogently at the time of § 526's enactment. K Mart, 486 U.S. at
315 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "Any prescient legislator who
could have contemplated that a trademark owner might license the use of its trademark
would almost certainly have concluded that such a transaction would divest the licensor...
of all trademark protection." Id. A view of trademarks as universal would preclude the
possibility of assignment through a license. See id. Thus, the authorized use exception
involved an application of the statute to a situation not foreseen by its drafters, and did not
implicate the interests driving its enactment. Id.
As further support for his position, Justice Brennan notes that the floor debate expired
before the question of whether an international corporation that registers a trademark
through a United States domiciled entity or agent may have that entity enjoin parallel
importation of those goods. Id. at 306 (citing 62 CONG. REC. 11,585, 11,605 (1922)). The
exclusion of any specific answer to the question of "common control" heightened the def-
erence entitled to Treasury's interpretation of the statute over the period following its en-
actment, which led to a series of exceptions to § 526 based on the relationship between the
foreign parent and the American subsidiary. See id. at 309-11. Accordingly, the practice of
parallel importation should be allowed to stand unless Congress speaks to silence it, and
implicitly, Treasury's "long-standing agency position" of allowing gray market merchandise
into the country evidenced Congress' intent that it continue. Id.
83. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291. In deciding whether to defer to agency interpretation, the
Court applied the two-part test developed in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291. Under this analy-
sis, if Congress unambiguously has stated its intent, the reviewing court cannot inquire
further because it is bound to uphold the intent of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
However, if the statute is ambiguous, then the court must determine whether the agency
has permissibly interpreted the statute. Id. at 843. The court does not have to agree; it
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did not remove all the weapons from the legal arsenal of the manufac-
turer,84 preventing the importation of gray market goods at the United
States border became all but impossible because of the relationship that
typically exists between a United States trademark owner and a foreign
producer.8 5 In the absence of legislation directly addressing parallel im-
portation,86 the opponents of the gray market turned to a theory that
focused on the quality of the goods themselves.87
3. The Prevention of Brand Confusion and the Material Difference
Standard
Although the K Mart decision addressed the congruity of the Customs
regulations with the Tariff Act, it did not address their relationship with
federal trademark law and policy.8 8 As discussed, the K Mart Court's
must only find the interpretation reasonable. Id. at 843 n.11. In K Mart, because of the
ambiguity of the words "of foreign manufacture," the interpretation given by Customs
passed the reasonableness test. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 292 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), 294 (holding that the common control and same entity exemp-
tions constitute a permissible construction of § 526).
The Court stated its distaste for overturning agency practice as one of the reasons for
upholding the common control exemption, and, perhaps more importantly, the "immense
domestic retail industry" that has grown around the importation of gray market goods. Id.
at 312; see also J. Thomas Warlick IV, Of Blue Light Specials and Gray-Market Goods: The
Perpetuation of the Parallel Importation Controversy, 39 EMORY L.J. 347, 404 (1990)
("K Mart is ... a policy determination in the guise of statutory construction"). Justice
Scalia's approach would have required Customs to detain all unauthorized genuine goods
at the border. See id. at 318 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Court may not have wanted to eliminate this entire industry by judicial fiat. See K Mart,
486 U.S. at 316 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Alternatively, the
Court's holding could have recognized a concern that multinational corporations could
otherwise profit twice from the sale of the same product: once when sold abroad, and again
when the courts enjoin the importation of the gray good. Ghosh, supra note 2, at 380
(characterizing the K Mart decision in this fashion).
84. K Mart, 486 U.S. at 291. Despite the survival of 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (c)(1) & (2),
the foreign affiliate may still sue for infringement based on 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l)(a) (1994)
(barring the use of a registered mark'in conjunction with any goods if the use will cause
consumer confusion) or for an injunction against the Customs service, if the Customs ser-
vice's administration and enforcement of § 526 of the Tariff Act is improper. See, e.g.,
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding jurisdiction
over matters relating to § 526 on this basis), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986). The foreign
affiliate may also bring suit. Duracell, Inc. v. Global Imports, Inc., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1651, 1653 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
85. See supra note 3 (describing the structure of gray market importation).
86. See generally Yoshor, supra note 54, at 1383-90 (asserting that legislation is the
only solution to the gray market phenomenon).
87. See discussion infra notes 89-109 and accompanying text (describing the use of the
Lanham Act as a weapon against the gray market).
88. See K Mart, 486 U.S. at 290 n.3 (noting that the plaintiff had also asserted that the
Customs regulations were at odds with § 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994),
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interpretation of the Tariff Act prevents the importation of identical gen-
uine goods when the importer will blatantly "free ride" on the marketing
investments of an independent American trademark owner.89 Section 526
only protects the United States trademark owner from gray market im-
portation based on its relationship with the foreign trademark owner, and
not based on any particular characteristics of the goods themselves.9"
Another problem with gray goods that may arise is that the goods pre-
pared for sale abroad physically may differ in some respect from goods
intended for sale domestically, thereby causing consumer confusion when
they appear on the American market.9
Under the Lanham Act, if the United States trademark owner can
prove that the unauthorized goods bear a material difference from those
intended for domestic production, then it can either enjoin their importa-
tion at the border,92 or seek civil damages for trademark infringement.93
which bars the importation of products bearing trademarks that copy or simulate those of a
United States trademark owner).
89. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the rationale behind the enactment of § 526 of the Tariff Act); see also
Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (dealing with gray
market camera equipment). In Osawa, the "free ride" taken by the gray marketer caused
a drop in sales, resulting in the layoffs of part of its repair force as well as a reduction in the
efficiency of warranty service. Id. These layoffs have prompted some labor groups to op-
pose parallel importation. See Senate Hearing on S. 626, supra note 3, at 126-29 (statement
of the AFL-CIO) (arguing that the sale of gray goods destroys jobs along the domestic
distribution chain).
90. See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(2) (1995) (allowing the importation of goods bearing
a United States trademark if the United States trademark owner is controlled by or shares
common control with the foreign trade name or trademark owner). See also supra notes
59-86 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of these Customs
regulations in K Mart v. Cartier).
91. See, e.g., Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633,
642-43 (1st Cir. 1992) (noting that chocolate destined for Venezuelan market has different
flavoring characteristics than that destined for the United States); Lever Bros. Co. v.
United States, 877 F.2d. 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (observing that Sunlight brand soap
slated for distribution in the United Kingdom is made for the harder water found there,
and furthermore does not have to meet FDA standards); Original Appalachian Artworks,
Inc. v. Granada Elec., Inc., 816 F.2d 68, 72-73 (2d Cir.) (noting that Cabbage Patch dolls
made by Spanish licensee had "adoption papers" in Spanish and did not provide for "birth-
day card" delivery, as compared to the U.S. distributor), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 847 (1987);
Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading Co., 753 F. Supp. 1240, 1247 (D.N.J.) (finding a ca-
loric difference between Tic Tac mints destined for England and those intended for the
United States), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 952 F.2d 44 (3d. Cir.
1991); Dial Corp. v. Encina Corp., 643 F. Supp. 951, 952 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding that
allegations of differences in soap labeling and formulation will support an infringement
claim under the Lanham Act).
92. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The rele--
vant parts of § 42 of the Lanham Act provide that no imported good that:
[S]hall copy or simulate the name of... [any] domestic manufacture, or manufac-
turer, or trader, or of any manufacturer or trader located in any foreign country
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This protection also applies to United States affiliates of foreign trade-
mark registrants because, "when identical trademarks have acquired dif-
ferent meanings in different countries, one who imports the foreign
version to sell it under that trademark will (in the absence of some spe-
cially differentiating feature) cause the confusion that Congress sought to
avoid." 94
For example, in Lever Bros. v. United States,95 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia found that differences in the fra-
grance, color, and packaging of dish and deodorant soap between the do-
mestic good and the gray import could cause consumer confusion. 96 In
that case, the court considered specifically whether section 42 of the Lan-
ham Act 97 prohibited Customs from admitting gray goods physically dif-
ferent from those sold by the United States trademark owner.98
Although conceding that a trademark owner cannot infringe its own
which, by treaty, convention, or law affords similar privileges to citizens of the
United States ... or shall bear a name or mark calculated to induce the public to
believe that the article is manufactured in the United States, or that it is manufac-
tured in any foreign country or locality other than the country or locality in which
it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse in the
United States.
15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994).
93. Section 32(1)(a) of the Lanham Act of 1946 provides that:
1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant:
a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation
of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any foods or services ... with which such use is likely to cause
confusion ... shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant.
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1994).
Section 43(a)(1) of the Lanham Act provides that:
Any person who ... uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol ... or any
false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or mis-
leading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion ... as to the
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods , . . shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is likely to be damaged by such
act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994). Despite the differing language of §§ 42 and 43, "liability
necessarily turns on the existence vel non of material differences between the products of a
sort likely to create consumer confusion." Nestle, 982 F.2d at 1340.
94. Lever 1, 877 F.2d at 111.
95. 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
96. Id. at 1340.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994).
98. Lever I, 877 F.2d at 104. Prior to the Lever cases, Customs had ignored physical
differences between goods when those goods bore valid marks from a manufacturer affili-
ated with the U.S. markholder. Id.; see 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1995). Imported goods
that do not differ physically from those sold by the United States trademark owner, how-
ever, do not violate § 42. See Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 668 n.ll
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989).
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mark, the court declared that the affiliation between parent and subsidi-
ary becomes irrelevant when third parties import physically different
goods.99 Thus, if the third party has imported the materially differing
good without the consent of the trademark owner, the same brand confu-
sion results as if the trademark was infringed by an unaffiliated domestic
competitor. 100
Although the Lever decision created the material difference standard,
it gave little direction as to the proper manner in which it should be ap-
plied.' 1 In Societe Des Produits Nestle v. Casa Helvetia,"°2 the First Cir-
cuit stated that a reviewing court should center its inquiry on "subtle
differences.' 1 3 In determining whether the differences between the two
99. Lever 1H, 981 F.2d at 1338. The D.C. Circuit based its ruling on the principle of
territoriality, which states that trademarks have different identities in different regions, and
that the determination of a good's genuineness must be determined from the viewpoint of
the consumer. Id. In determining that materially different goods infringe the trademark
owner's rights under § 42 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1994), the D.C. Circuit
significantly undercut the effect of the K-Mart holding. Lever 11, 981 F.2d at 1338; cf
K Mart V. Cartier, 481 U.S. 281, 295-96 (1987) (holding that Customs does not have to
block the importation of goods bearing a trademark held by a U.S. affiliate).
Customs allowed the goods at issue into the country pursuant to the affiliate exception
currently contained in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1994). Lever 11, 981 F.2d at 1331. Al-
though the meaning of § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930 paralleled that of § 42 in the case of
identical goods, the D.C. Circuit found nothing in the administrative practice of the Cus-
toms service or the legislative history of § 42 that warranted the admission of physically
different products, even when the American trademark owner shares common control with
the foreign manufacturer within the meaning of 19 C.F.R. § 133.2(d)(2). Lever 1I, 981 F.2d
at 1338 (applying Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-43 (1984)). In sum, Customs cannot indiscriminately apply the affiliate exception up-
held in K Mart - to the extent that the plain meaning of § 42 conflicts with the agency
interpretation of § 526 contained in 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2), the plainly expressed intent
must prevail. Lever H, 981 F.2d at 1333-34.
100. Id. (applying 17 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988)) (stating that physically different foreign
goods bearing trademarks identical to those used in the United States are not genuine to
the domestic consumer); Lever 1, 877 F.2d at 108 (observing that differing conditions in the
United States and the United Kingdom caused the plaintiff's trademarks to acquire differ-
ent meanings in the two countries, and therefore the use of the English trademark in the
United States is deceptive).
101. Lever II, 981 F.2d at 1332, 1338; see also Lever 1, 877 F.2d at 111 (describing the
consumer confusion caused by materially different trademarks).
102. 982 F.2d 633 (1st Cir. 1992).
103. Id. at 641 (citing Ferrero U.S.A., Inc. v. Ozak Trading, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 1240,
1243-44, 1247 (D.N.J.), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1281 (3d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 952 F.2d 44
(3d Cir. 1991)).
Nestle involved the unauthorized importation of chocolate destined for the Venezuelan
market. Nestle, 982 F.2d at 635. The chocolates originated in Italy, but Nestle licensed an
independent distribution company to manufacture them in Venezuela. Id. After discon-
tinuing its distribution arrangements in Puerto Rico with the defendant, Nestle's ex-distrib-
utor bought the Venezuelan chocolates from a middleman and sold them in Puerto Rico
without Nestle's consent. Id.
1996] Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law
types of chocolates were material, the court looked to five specific fac-
tors: quality control, composition, configuration, packaging, and price. °4
The court held that the unauthorized goods infringed Nestle's mark, as
the products intended for sale in the United States market differed from
the Venezuelan ones with respect to these factors. 105 Thus, a "material
difference" in products must be determined on a case-by-case basis and
may turn on extremely small factual distinctions.
1 6
The need for detailed factual findings like those supporting the holding
in the Nestle decision sends a simple message to a manufacturer wishing
to eliminate or discourage unauthorized importation of its goods: make
sure that the goods have slight, but tangible differences in each regional
marketplace, "for it is by subtle differences that consumers are most eas-
ily confused."' 0 7 If a company imports the goods into the United States
without authorization, then the trademark law will protect the domestic
trademark owner's goodwill.' Yet, trademark law still renders a plain-
104. Id. at 642-43. In applying these criteria, the Nestle court looked at differences not
readily apparent to the customs official for the purposes of § 42 of the Lanham Act without
the expenditure of significant investigative effort. Differences in "milk fat content," for
example, could be "potentially significant." Id. at 644. With regard to packaging and con-
figuration, the Court looked at "differences in presentation and chocolate shape." Id. at
643. Nonetheless, although administrative realities may allow these infringing goods to
entering the domestic market because of the level of factual analysis the Nestle decision
requires, the American trademark owner will still have recourse under § 43 and § 32(a)(1).
See Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19, 23-24 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (find-
ing, in a case where materially different goods have entered the country, that the defendant
had infringed the plaintiff's trademark under § 43 and § 32). But cf. supra note 27 (dis-
cussing a blanket rule proposal implementing the Lever and Nestle decisions).
105. Nestle, 982 F.2d at 644.
106. Id. at 641. ("[w]ith the importation of gray goods, a reviewing court must necessar-
ily be concerned with subtle differences, for it is by subtle differences that consumers are
most easily confused"). Given the volume of goods coming into the United States daily,
however, one wonders how Customs will be able to administrate these subtle differences.
107. Nestle, 982 F.2d at 641. But see Gorelick and Little, supra note 1, at 214, (sug-
gesting additionally that the manufacturer sells the good at the same price in the United
States and abroad). However, this latter suggestion somewhat sweepingly assumes that
price discrimination causes gray market importation, when the weight of evidence suggests
that currency fluctuation causes it. See supra note 2 (discussing the effect of changing
currency rates on gray market importation).
108. See Barry P. Miller, New Risks to Importers of Gray Market Goods, TRADEMARKS
AMERICA, April 1993, at 18 (asserting that Lever and Nestle increase the risk of gray mar-
ket activity). Miller also points out that because § 42 of the Lanham Act does not require
that the owner of the mark be a U.S. citizen or corporation, a domestic trademark owner
could theoretically use the law to prevent either the re-importation of American manufac-
tured goods or the importation of foreign goods that meet the Nestle physical differences
test. Id. at 16; cf also Nestle, 982 F.2d at 638-40 (omitting any discussion regarding the
nationality of the plaintiff as a relevant factor in determining liability). For a thorough
discussion of the implications of the Lever decisions, see generally Theodore H. Davis, Jr.,
Lever Bros. v. United States and the legality of Gray Market Imports: A New Shield (R) for
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tiff unable to prevent gray imports physically identical to those sold by
the authorized distributor.10 9
C. The Appeal of Copyright and the Immateriality of Difference
The United States copyright system, like its English ancestor, ° is a
creature of the legislature, provided entirely by statute. 1' Section 106 of
the Copyright Act of 1976112 enumerates the five basic rights of the copy-
right holder: reproduction,1 3 the preparation of derivative works,'14 dis-
United States Trademark Owners in Transnational Markets, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 571
(1993) (examining the Lever decision's interaction with § 526 of the Tariff Act, as well as
traditional trademark doctrine). One scholar asserts that, as an economic matter, the
trademark law should protect the American public from undifferentiated materially differ-
ent gray imports. See Ghosh, supra note 2, at 374, 428, 434 (demonstrating that materially
different gray market goods, if unlabeled, could negatively affect consumer welfare).
109. See Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 685 (3d Cir. 1989) (stat-
ing that the importation of identical goods is not an infringement), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
853 (1989); cf. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290 n.3 (1987) (declining to
address the implications of gray market importation under 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)&(2) on
federal trademark law and policy).
110. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printed
Books in the Author's or Purchasers of Such Copies, 8 Anne, c.19 (1709), reprinted in 3
FARRAND, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 36 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
1987). In order to encourage "learned men to compose and write useful books," the Act
gave authors "the sole right and liberty of printing such book and books for the term of
one and twenty years." Id.
As in England, the commercial and cultural advances created by this limited grant drove
the enactment of colonial legislation, see James Madison, Act Securing Copyright for Au-
thors, Virginia House of Delegates, 8 The Papers of James Madison 418-19, reprinted in
FARRAND, supra, at 39, and eventually, a provision in the Constitution granting Congress
authority to enact copyright statutes. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. (expressly granting
Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries"). James Madison noted that "[t]he utility of this power will scarcely
be questioned .... The States cannot separately make effectual provision for either of the
cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the
instance of Congress." THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (James Madison). The Founders' faith in
the production incentives created by the copyright system appears to be well founded;
industries that have the benefit of copyright have generally outgrown other sectors of the
economy. See STEPHEN E. SIWEK AND HAROLD FURCHTGO-r-RoTH, COPYRIGHT INDUS-
TRIES IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: 1977-1990 7 (1992). The "core" copyright industries (news-
papers, periodicals, movies, advertisements, and computer software) grew at an annual
compounded rate of more than 6.2%, as compared to a 2.4% growth rate for the rest of the
economy. Id.
111. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834) (stating that, under the com-
mon law of the United States or England, an inventor does not have a perpetual monopoly
on his invention); see also Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 281 (2d Cir. 1929)
(adamantly declining to create a common law copyright system), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728
(1930).
112. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994))
113. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994) (giving the copyright holder the right to duplicate his
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tribution,115 public performance, 1 6 and display.117  Over the last two
centuries, parties have litigated the scope of that statutory grant in nu-
works). A copyright protects a work embodied in a "fixed" medium of expression, mean-
ing one embodied in a "permanent or stable" form. Id. § 101. Reproduction, therefore,
for the purposes of the Act, does not always equal "copying," as some reproduction may
not result in a "fixed" object. 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.02[A] (1995); see Corcoran v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 121 F.2d 572, 573-74 (9th Cir.) (holding that the protection
afforded the copyright holder is limited to the form in which the work is registered; for
example, setting a copyrighted narrative poem, registered as a book to music did not con-
stitute a reproduction of the poem for the purposes of the statute), cert. denied, 314 U.S.
687 (1941).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). Section 101 of the statute defines a derivative work as one
"based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical arrangement,
dramatization, fictionalization ... or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted." Id. § 101; see also Mirage Editions, Inc. v. Albuquerque A.R.T. Co.,
856 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding that tiles made from the artworks contained in
a book qualify as derivative works), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1018 (1989); Harry Fox Agency,
Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 849 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (defining a derivative work
as one "substantially derived from an underlying work"), rev'd, 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
115. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994). See 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.11[a] (noting that
only distribution to the "public at large" will infringe the distribution right). In order to
violate this right, an infringer must actually give the physical object in which the copyright
is embodied to members of the public; again, like the reproduction right of § 106(1), a
performance of the work would not infringe the rights of the copyright holder under the
distribution section. See National Car Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 991
F.2d 426, 434 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that allowing other companies to use a copyrighted
software program that has been exclusively licensed to the original user does not constitute
an infringement of the distribution right because no actual copies were made), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 176 (1993).
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). Section 101 defines performance as the recital or other play-
back of a work on any type of device. 17 U.S.C. § 101. In order to provide a cause of
action under the statute, however, the performance must also be public. 2 NIMMER, supra
note 113, § 8.14[C]. The playing of a movie to family and friends, therefore, although tech-
nically a performance, would not infringe the rights of the copyright holder because it is
not a public performance. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 64 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5659, 5677 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476].
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106(5). Section 101 defines display as the showing of a copy of a work
"by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process." Id. § 101. The
display must also be public. See 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, §§ 8.14[C), 8.20[A] (outlining
the elements of the publicity requirement and noting that a display must be public to vio-
late the Copyright Act). The owner of a lawfully made copy, however, generally may dis-
play the work with impunity, provided that the owner displays the work directly or one
image at a time, and that the viewer be present in the same place in which the work is
located. Id. § 8.20[B]. Display, as opposed to performance, involves the showing of part of
a work. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (defining-the display of a motion picture as the showing
of nonsequential images); Red Baron Franklin-Park, Inc., v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 279
(4th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing performance, e.g., the showing of images in order, from
display, e.g., the showing of the same pictures out of sequence), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1058
(1990); 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.20[A] (noting that the images of a work must be
shown sequentially to constitute a performance and, conversely, that the nonsequential
display of images does not violate the Act).
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merous contexts.118 In the 1980s, practitioners found a relatively novel
use for the copyright system: to use it to circumvent the affiliate excep-
tion upheld in K Mart."9 This use of the copyright law, as a practical
matter, became another wedge in solving what was mainly a trademark
problem.
120
Despite the inroads made in the Nestle line of cases regarding "mate-
rial differences,"'' the domestic trademark owner still needed a way to
prevent the sale of gray market goods if they: 1) perfectly mirrored those
sold in the United States; and 2) bore a United States trademark owned
by a United States affiliate of a foreign trademark registrant.122 The
sword of trademark is inherently limited by its purpose-preventing
brand confusion and encouraging the presence of quality goods on the
118. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Co. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 155, 162-64 (1974)
(holding that a restaurant owner playing a copyrighted musical composition received over
a licensed radio station has not infringed the rights of the holder, and noting in dictum that
singing someone else's song in the shower is also not an infringement); Bellsouth Advertis-
ing & Pub. Corp. v. Donnelly Info. Pub., Inc., 933 F.2d 952, 960 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that transferring the overall format of a rival's telephone directory onto a computer me-
dium constitutes an infringement of the rival's copyrighted compilation), vacated, 977 F.2d
1435 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Daly v. Webster, 56 F. 483, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1892) (holding
that the classic dramatic scene in which a hapless victim is bound to train tracks and subse-
quently rescued is "common literary property" and unprotected by copyright law provided
the familiar elements of the story are simply adjusted or rearranged), appeal denied, 163
U.S. 155 (1896).
119. See, e.g., Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093,
1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (describing the domestic copyright holder's claim that the unauthorized
importation of goods bearing a United States copyright infringed its rights under § 602, but
holding that the sale of the goods abroad may extinguish § 602's protection); Neutrogena
Corp. v. United States, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900,1903 (D.S.C. 1988) (adjudicating a simi-
lar claim); Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 346-47 (S.D. Fla.
1985) (same); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D. Fla. 1985)
(holding that the sale of Trivial Pursuit games in the United States that were intended for
sale in Canada infringes the rights of the U.S. copyright holder).
120. See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 286-87 (1987) (describing the three
general contexts in which gray market importation arises); see also Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (describing the harm to the trademark
owner caused by the sales of gray market imports); see also supra notes 43-58 and accom-
panying text (providing an overview of the gray market).
121. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 641 (1st Cir.
1992) (establishing a low threshold of "subtle differences" whether a material difference
exists between a U.S. trademark owner's product and the gray market import). See supra
notes 88-109 and accompanying text (discussing the development of the material difference
doctrine).
122. Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659, 675 (3d Cir.) (holding that a
domestic trademark owner affiliated with a foreign trademark owner may not bring a
trademark suit against its foreign affiliate), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989); NEC Elec. v.
CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509-10 (9th Cir.) (holding that a domestic subsidiary of
a foreign manufacturer may not invoke the Lanham Act against companies that buy identi-
cal goods abroad to sell in the United States), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 851 (1987).
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market.' 23 When the consumer buys an identical gray good and is satis-
fied with the product, theoretically, the transaction runs no less efficiently
than one involving an authorized import.124 Indeed, consumers buy gray
market goods because they think that they are getting the same product
for less money, and the advertising practices of gray market retailers re-
flect that fact. 125 The identical gray good, therefore, does not directly
subvert the policy directives that the trademark law advances.'
26
In contrast, copyright law has different policy goals that make it an
attractive weapon for fighting the gray market.1 27 First, the issue of con-
sumer confusion, and its deleterious effects on competition 128 generally
bears no relevance to copyright law. Instead, copyright law strives to ad-
vance public welfare by allowing authors and inventors to control the ex-
ploitation of their works.' 29  In copyright cases involving parallel
123. See MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.01[2] (describing the economic benefits of
trademarks); Landes and Posner, supra note 43, at 268-72 (defining the purposes of trade-
marks similarly).
124. Cf. Landes and Posner, supra note 43, at 268-70 (stating that the consumer's iden-
tification of the qualities associated with a particular brand via the trademark makes mar-
ket transactions more efficient by reducing search costs). Other policy objectives,
however, may become implicated by the transaction. For example, if goods bought on the
gray market were made abroad and competed against goods manufactured in the United
States, the purchase of those goods would deny the domestic manufacturer the revenue
from its sale, possibly causing the domestic manufacturer to lay off some of its labor force.
Cf In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, 838 (1984) (observing that
the revenue lost from the sale of gray market goods caused a loss of goodwill on the part of
the American trademark, low morale among sales personnel and lower production).
125. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting
that, to the extent that the gray market retailer advertises the brand name, it is only in a
one-line-per-item listing to indicate low prices).
126. MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.01[1] (noting that trademark law advances the poli-
cies of "consumer protection, property rights, economic efficiency, and universal concepts
of justice"). By positively identifying a manufacturing source, the trademark promotes the
production of quality products. Id. § 2.01[2][a], at 2-4. Second, by identifying the source
of manufacture, the trademark makes the market more efficient by decreasing the con-
sumer's cost of collecting information about products. Id. § 2.01[2][b], at 2-7. See also
Landes and Posner, supra note 43, at 268 (describing the trademark as a marketing short-
cut). The purpose of copyright law, on the other hand, revolves around the provision of
production incentives for authors and inventors. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; THE
FEDERALIST No. 34 (James Madison).
127. The Supreme Court has made it clear that courts should not draw analogies be-
tween the two areas. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19
(1983) (noting that the standard used to determine contributory infringement in a trade-
mark suit does not apply in the copyright arena); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore
Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (stating that equating trademark rights with those
granted by a copyright is a "fundamental error").
128. See MCCARTHY, supra note 45, § 2.03.
129. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), reprinted in E. FULTON BRYLAW-
SKI AND ABE GOLDMAN, 6 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT Acr S1-S21
(1976). As the House Judiciary Committee stated in 1909:
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importation, it is precisely the similarity of the imported item to the do-
mestic one that creates an infringement. 3 °
Second, the Copyright Act makes unauthorized importation of a copy-
righted work acquired outside the United States an infringement of the
distribution right under § 106.'13 Unlike trademark and tariff case law,
the affiliation of the American copyright holder with a foreign producer
is irrelevant to the question of infringement. 132 In this sense, § 106(3)
grants a right to control distribution.1
33
Third, the Copyright Act's damage remedies enhance its allure as a
weapon against gray market importation. Among the remedies available
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress . . . is not based upon any
natural right that the author has in his writings ... but upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be
promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their
writings.
Id. at S7; see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 429 (1983) (stating that "[The copyright law] is in-
tended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a
special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired"); TWentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (noting that "[pirivate motivation must ultimately serve the cause
of promoting broad public availability of literature, music and the other arts"); American
GeoPhysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 802 F. Supp. 1, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (commenting that the
copyright laws encourage the growth of knowledge by guaranteeing the author the oppor-
tunity to profit from his writings), aff'd, 37 F.3d 881 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 116 S.
Ct. 592 (1995); see also supra notes 110-l1 (discussing the historical incentives behind the
enactment of copyright legislation).
Congress has deemed the policy goals advanced by this protection important enough to
require only that a work be "original," and does not require that it have "novelty, ingenu-
ity, or esthetic merit." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 51, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5664; see also Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service, 499 U.S. 340,
346 (1991) (noting that the word 'original' as used in the copyright context means only that
the work was independently created by the author and possesses a minimal amount of
creativity). Another attraction, therefore, is the ease with which a manufacturer theoreti-
cally could create a protectable work. See generally NEIL BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW
§ 2.2 (1981) (describing the nature of the originality standard); see also Sebastian Int'l, Inc.,
v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding the requi-
site originality on a shampoo label's description of the product's properties).
130. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Casino Record Distribs. of Fla., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 677, 678-79
(S.D. Fla. 1987) (finding that the defendant violated § 602 through the importation of le-
gally made works identical to those sold by the American copyright holder); Hearst Corp.
v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding similarly); Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49-50 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding
similarly), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
131. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
132. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 482-83 (9th Cir.
1994) (declining to create an affiliate exception to § 602), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315
(1995); see also infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history
of § 602).
133. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994).
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to the successful plaintiff"' are injunction, 135 actual and statutory dam-
ages, 136 and, most importantly, attorney's fees.' 37 As both the gray mar-
keter and the manufacturer usually pursue their positions aggressively,
the prospect of paying the other side's lawyers greatly increases the risks
of gray market importing.
138
The distribution right of § 106(3), and the attendant importation re-
striction, however, find their limitations in the "first sale doctrine" codi-
fied in § 109(a), which limits the copyright owner's right to control future
transfers of once the first sale is made. 139 Despite the attractiveness of
this particular body of law to address the gray market problem, the plain
134. Cf. id. § 501(a) (stating that infringement occurs upon the violation of any of the
copyright holder's rights in §§ 106-118, or the importation of copies or phonorecords in
violation of § 602).
135. Id. § 502(a) (granting any court with jurisdiction the power to grant temporary and
final injunctions to prevent or restrain copyright infringement).
136. Id. § 504(b), (c). The plaintiff can compute damages through a number of
schemes. In addition to its own lost profits, the copyright holder is entitled to any profits
acquired by the infringer. Id. § 502(b). The copyright owner only must show the gross
receipts of the infringer. Id. § 504(a)(1). Once he does, the burden shifts back to the
infringer to demonstrate deductible expenses "and the elements of profit attributable to
factors other than the copyrighted work." Id. § 504(b).
The copyright holder also has the option to accept an award of statutory damages be-
tween $500 and $20,000 before final judgment; Congress left the amount awarded within
that range to the discretion of the court. Id. § 504(c)(1). Furthermore, if the plaintiff
proves that the infringement was committed "willfully" (i.e. with the knowledge that the
action in question infringed the copyright), the plaintiff could receive as much as $100,000.
Id. § 504(c)(2). By the same token, the defendant's unawareness that his acts constituted
infringement may lead the court to reduce the damages. Id.
Section 412 of the Act, however, conditions the award of statutory damages and attor-
neys fees on timely registration. 17 U.S.C. § 412 (1994). Courts will not award either rem-
edy to a successful plaintiff if copyright infringement occurred after the publication of a
work but before its registration, unless the copyright is registered within three months of
initial publication. Id. (also denying statutory damages and attorneys' fees for infringe-
ment commenced before the effective date of registration of a copyright in unpublished
works). Congress limited the applicability of both remedies to encourage the prompt regis-
tration of published works. See H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 158 (noting that
because the Act does not compel copyright registration, some means of inducing the
prompt registration of works is necessary), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5774.
137. 17 U.S.C. '§ 505 (making the award of fees entirely discretionary). The Supreme
Court recently announced that in determining whether the prevailing party should receive
attorney's fees, a reviewing court should consider the totality of the circumstances sur-
rounding the suit, including its frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness, and
the need to further the related considerations of compensation and deterrence. Fogarty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1033 n.19 (1994).
138. Cf. Hansen, supra note 2, at 250 & n.7 (noting the intervention on behalf of the
importers by two prominent retailers and permanent development of a trade association,
the Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT), on the behalf
of American trademark owners).
139. 17 U.S:C. § 109(a) states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
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language of these two sections leaves uncertain whether the provisions of
§ 109 also limit the importation rights of the copyright holder under
§ 602.140 The case law has yielded inconsistent answers.'41
II. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMPETING SECTIONS
A conflict has developed in the federal circuits over the proper interac-
tion between the importation restriction contained in § 602 and the first
sale right embodied in § 109.142 The problem stems from the wording of
the two sections. An importation of a copyright owner's work without his
consent infringes the distribution right under § 106.113 Section 109, how-
ever, expressly terminates the copyright holder's right to control distribu-
tion once a particular copy of a work has been sold."' Thus, the question
has arisen as to how courts should treat the unauthorized importation of
a copyrighted work first sold abroad. 45 In answering this question, an
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell
or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord." Id.
Piracy problems in the computer software business led Congress to enact a special ex-
ception to the provisions of § 109: computer software, once bought, cannot be rented or
leased for profit. The Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, 104 Stat. 5134 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1994)). For a thorough
discussion of these provisions, see Kenneth R. Corsello, Note, The Computer Software
Rental Amendments Act of 1990: Another Bend in the First Sale Doctrine, 41 CATH. U. L.
REV. 177 (1991).
140. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text (discussing the plain language of
§ 109 and § 602).
141. See infra notes 142-99 and accompanying text (describing the Circuit Courts of
Appeals' conflicting constructions of these sections).
142. Compare generally BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding a
§ 602 violation), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992), and Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug
Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477,479 (9th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995)
with Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir.
1988) (finding no violation). See also infra notes 148-99 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the Circuit Courts of Appeals' conflicting constructions in these cases).
143. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
144. Id. § 109(a).
145. Different courts have found different answers. Compare BMG Music, 952 F.2d at
319 (recognizing that "the first sale doctrine in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) does not ... provide a
defense to infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 602 for goods manufactured 'abroad");
Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482 n.7 (declining to consider the outcome in Sebastian) with Sebas-
tian, 847 F.2d at 1098 (using a different construction of sections 109 and 602 to arrive at the
opposite result for domestically manufactured goods).
Unfortunately, the seminal importation restrictions shed no light on the newer and more
sweeping restriction of § 602. Restrictions on the importation of copyrighted works pre-
date the ratification of the Constitution, see James Madison, An Act Securing Copyright
for Authors, Virginia House of Delegates, 16 Nov. 1785, reprinted in 3 FARRAND, supra
note 110, at 39 (stating that anyone who "shall import into this commonwealth, from any
foreign kingdom or state, any printed or re-printed copies of such book or pamphlet, with-
out the consent of the author or proprietor thereof first obtained in writing ... shall forfeit
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odd focus on the site of manufacture has emerged,146 despite Congress'
explicit statements that the Copyright Act's manufacturing requirements
and the importation right granted in § 602 exist independently of one
another. 147
A. The Development of the Manufacturing Requirement
The first case addressing the effect of § 109's first sale doctrine on
to the party injured, double the value of all copies so printed"), and have appeared in each
revision of the copyright law since the formation of the Republic. See The Copyright Act
of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (barring importation of a copyrighted article without the copy-
right owner's consent).
In a later revision, Congress added a provision making it an infringement to import
books printed abroad. See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 565, § 7, 26 Stat. 1106, 1109 (1891).
The last substantial revision of the Copyright Act before 1976 occurred in 1909, and that
statute also contained similar protective language. See The Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 302,
§ 15, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078-79 (1909), reprinted in 6 BRYLAWSKI AND GOLDMAN, supra note
129, § 15, at T109-110 (requiring books to be printed within the United States or on plates
type-set within the United States in order for the work to enjoy copyright protection). In
the 1909 Act, the importation restrictions applicable to non-literary goods barred only the
importation of piratical items or those bearing a false notice of copyright. Id. Section 32 of
the 1909 Act, which applied to literary and non-literary works, prohibited the importation
of any article bearing a false notice of copyright when no American copyright existed, or of
any piratical copies of any work copyrighted in the United States. Copyright Act of 1909,
35 Stat. 1075, 1082 (1909), reprinted in 6 BRYLAWSKI & GOLDMAN, supra note 129, § 32, at
T120.
The current version of the copyright law, like its predecessors, also included a provision
requiring books to be printed within the United States, or on plates type-set within, to
enjoy copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 601(c)(1) (1994). Congress designed these restric-
tions as a protection for the printing industries. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5780-81; H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 11-13, reprinted in 6
BRYLAWSKI and GOLDMAN, supra note 129, at S12-S13. However, the manufacturing re-
strictions that survived the 1976 revision expired in July of 1986. See 17 U.S.C. § 601(a)
(1994). The expiration of § 601(a) undercuts the interpretation of § 602 that places an
emphasis on the situs of manufacture of a given work when determining whether an in-
fringement of the importation right has occurred. See infra note 147 (discussing Congress'
expression of intent regarding § 601).
For a thorough examination of these earlier revisions, see Perl, supra note 21, at 653-56.
146. See infra notes 163-98 and accompanying text (describing the necessity of a manu-
facturing requirement as a basis of distinction).
147. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 169, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5785 (stating flatly that § 602 "has nothing to do with the manufacturing requirements of
section 601," as they address two distinct problems). This exact report language accompa-
nied § 602's import restriction throughout the history of its development. See S. REP. No.
473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 151 (1975); S. REP. No. 983, 93d. Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1974); H.R.
REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 138 (1967); H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 166
(1966); COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, 89TH CONG., 2D SESS, SUPPLEMENTARY RE-
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW 148 (Comm. Print 1961); see generally COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION STUDY No.
35, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1963) (outlining the history of the manufacturing provision);
supra note 144 (discussing past versions of the manufacturing requirement).
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§ 602's importation right, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distributors, Inc.,148 involved phonorecords imported into the
United States, but only licensed for production and sale in the Philip-
pines. 149 Immediately prior to the termination of the licensing agree-
ment, a jobber15 ° bought several thousand copies of the recording from
the Philippine corporation, and imported them into the United States. 5'
The American copyright owner sued for infringement, alleging that by
bringing those records into the United States, Scorpio had infringed the
copyright holder's rights under § 602.152 The defendant responded by ar-
guing that § 109 shielded him from liability. 153 Focusing on § 109's
phrase "lawfully made under this title", the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania refused to extend the reach of the first sale doc-
trine beyond United States borders without express statutory authoriza-
tion, and held that the plaintiff's right to prevent unauthorized
importation did not expire with the sale of the recordings in the Philip-
pines. 154 Accordingly, the court concluded that the first sale defense
would succeed only if used to avoid liability for the importation of copies
first made and sold in the United States.'
55
In Cosmair v. Dynamite Enterprises,156 the situs of sale became the crit-
148. 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1984).
149. Id. at 47. CBS-Sony, a Japanese corporation, licensed the Philippine manufacturer
to produce records exclusively in the Philippines. Id. The plaintiff, a U.S. corporation,
held the copyright to the work and consented to the offshore production arrangement. Id.
150. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines a jobber as "a middleman ... one who buys
from a wholesaler and sells to a retailer." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 835 (6th ed. 1990).
151. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 47.
152. Id. (noting that although the record did not conclusively show whether the defend-
ant was the consignee of the infringing shipment, the law of vicarious liability in tort ac-
tions rendered that ambiguity irrelevant).
153. Id. at 49.
154. Id. (stating that "[tlhe protection afforded by the United States Code does not
extend beyond the borders of this country unless the Code expressly states. Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, statutory language must be recognized
as conclusive").
155. Id. The court further stressed that: "Construing § 109(a) as superseding the prohi-
bition on importation set forth in the more recently enacted § 602 would render § 602
virtually meaningless. Third party purchasers who import phonorecords could thereby cir-
cumvent the statute, in every instance, by simply buying the recordings indirectly." Id.
Under this analysis, the site of manufacture becomes irrelevant; the critical determination
is where the sale of the work took place. This interpretation meshes more readily with the
legislative history of the importation provision. See infra notes 201-29 and accompanying
text (discussing the history of § 602). The Scorpio court, however, does not refer to the
legislative history of either provision. Cf. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 47-49 (omitting any such
discussion).
156. 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
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ical focal point for determining whether an infringement had occurred.157
There, the plaintiff sold a quantity of Ralph Lauren fragrances to its dis-
tributor in Hong Kong, only to find them re-imported into the United
States by a third party. 58 In refusing to enjoin a domestic retailer from
disposing of the offending articles, the court reasoned that because title to
the goods passed in the United States, the sale occurred in the United
States, and the first sale doctrine therefore precluded importation
liability.' 59
Hearst Corporation v. Stark 6 ° added its own peculiar twist to the inter-
action between § 602 and § 109, but its result followed that in Scorpio.'6 '
In Hearst, the copyright holder sued an importer that bought several edi-
tions of a book lawfully made in England, and subsequently attempted to
bring them into the United States. 62 Deciding that § 109 did not limit
the importation right, the court contrasted § 109's reference to a "particu-
lar copy" of a work against the plural language of § 602,163 and concluded
that the importation of large quantities of books without authorization
157. Id. at 345-46; cf. Neutrogena Corp. v. United States, 7 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1900, 1903
(D.S.C. 1988) (commenting that, in a case involving the unauthorized importation of copy-
righted works, Cosmair provides the basis for denying a preliminary injunction).
158. Cosmair, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 345, 347.
159. Id. at 346-47. In Cosmair, the plaintiff shipped the goods CIF, passing title to the
buyer once the shipper receives the goods. Id. at 346. In finding for the defendant, the
court strained to point out that if the works had been manufactured abroad for distribution
in a specific geographic region, the outcome would have differed. Id. at 347; cf. infra notes
201-29 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of § 602 and arguing that
Congress intended to apply the provision to works destined for distribution abroad). Us-
ing § 602 to enjoin the sale of works sold in the United States not only would have violated
Congressional intent, but would also raise antitrust considerations. Cosmair, 226 U.S.P.Q.
at 346-47; cf infra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (discussing the antitrust concerns
embedded in the legislative history of § 109). In contrast, if the company made and sold
the goods abroad, liability would attach if the goods were imported without the American
copyright holder's consent. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319-20 (9th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992); Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970, 974-77 (N.D. Cal.
1986); Selchow & Righter Corp. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19, 25 (S.D. Fla. 1985); cf.
Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1098 (3d Cir. 1988)
(finding that the importation of works manufactured in the United States and sold abroad
does not violate the Copyright Act).
160. 639 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
161. Id. at 976-77; cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs.,
Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48-49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (reasoning that the first sale doctrine only
applies to products made in the United States), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1984).
162. Hearst, 639 F. Supp. at 972. This situation closely parallels the concerns raised
before the House Committee on Patents in the early 1960s. See infra notes 206-17 and
accompanying text (describing the panel discussions before the House Committee on Pat-
ents). The record in Hearst does not indicate whether currency fluctuations drove the
transaction.
163. Id. at 976.
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fits squarely within the literal terms of § 602.164
The importance of the manufacturing requirement became apparent
after the Third Circuit's decision in Sebastian International, Inc. v. Con-
sumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd. 6 5 In Sebastian, the plaintiff sold shampoo to
Consumer Contacts, which claimed that it desired to be Sebastian's first
and exclusive distributor of hair products in South Africa. 1 66 The cartons
were never opened; instead, Consumer Contacts shipped the shampoo
back to the United States and ultimately sold it to a large discount drug
chain.167 Initially, Sebastian sued for breach of contract and trademark
infringement.16  Further research indicated, however, that the label on
these shampoo bottles was copyrighted, and Sebastian amended its com-
plaint to assert a copyright claim under § 602.169 The district court
granted injunctive relief for copyright infringement, 7 ' but the Third Cir-
cuit vacated the injunction.
171
In rejecting the plaintiff's claim for infringement, the Court of Appeals
assumed that a copyright owner who sells copies of his works abroad has
already received a financial reward for his work. 72 From this premise,
the appellate court reasoned that, while unauthorized importation of a
work infringes the right to distribute copies, § 109(a) expressly limits the
distribution right.' 73 The court concluded that "it necessarily follows that
once transfer of ownership has canceled the distribution right to a copy,
the right does not survive so as to be infringed by importation."174 As
164. Id. The Hearst court also found that, contrary to the defendant's assertion, § 602's
importation restriction did not violate the First Amendment. Id. at 978.
165. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
166. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 911
(D.N.J. 1987), vacated, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. The Court of Appeals also noted this amendment. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1095.
Initially, Sebastian's counsel denied the existence of a copyright on the label. Sebastian,
664 F. Supp. at 911. This haphazard addition of the claim may have damaged the chances
of success on appeal. Cf. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1378, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the copyrighted box and bottle design contributed
significantly to the product's value and was an important part of the overall marketing
campaign).
170. Sebastian, 664 F. Supp. at 922. The district court, after discussing the legislative
history, id. at 915-16, would have extended the protection of § 602 to any transaction in-
volving the unauthorized importation of a copyrighted work. Id. at 920.
171. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099.
172. Id. Such a construction arguably ignores the realities of global business. See
Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1390 (noting that the holder of a copyright on a phonorecord
may sell copies for $10 in the United States, but must lower that price to $7 when entering
a foreign market).
173. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1098.
174. Id. at 1099. The court distinguished Scorpio by stating that when a licensee manu-
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construed by the Third Circuit, § 602 does not create a new right separate
from the distribution right grounded in § 106(3), but one subservient to
it.'75 Under a Sebastian analysis, the country of manufacture becomes
irrelevant because all distribution rights, including the importation right,
extinguish at the time of sale, irrespective of where the sale occurs.
17 6
In order to avoid a direct split in the authority, the Ninth Circuit used
the place of manufacture as the principal basis of distinction between Se-
bastian and BMG Music v. Perez.'7 7 In BMG Music, the defendant
bought sound recordings manufactured and sold abroad, and imported
them into the United States.' 78 BMG Music sued for infringement under
§ 602(a), and Perez asserted the first sale doctrine as a defense. 179 The
Ninth Circuit held that the first sale defense only applies to copies pro-
duced and sold in the United States.' 8 ° However, the Ninth Circuit took
particular care to limit its holding to the facts before it, and distinguished
BMG Music from Sebastian on the ground that the goods there were
originally manufactured and sold in the United States. 8 '
Despite this disclaimer, the court suggested in dicta that a reading of
§ 109 that allows it to supersede the distribution right granted by § 602
renders the latter a practical surplusage.'82 Had the Ninth Circuit fol-
factures a given copy, the copyright holder does not own it and, by implication, the impor-
tation protection survives. Id. at 1099 n.3.
175. Id. at 1098.
176. Id. at 1098 n.1 (noting that § 109's limitation of the distribution right to works
"lawfully made" under this title may bear no relation to the place of manufacture because
of Congress's practice of explicitly stating when the site of manufacture becomes legally
significant).
177. 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992).
178. Id. at 319.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 319 n.3 (noting that Sebastian "involved the exportation and later importa-
tion of copyrighted goods originally manufactured and sold in the United States," and
explicitly declining to pass judgment on its set of facts); cf. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Con-
sumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1099 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding that the right con-
tained in § 602 does not create a protection in addition to that provided by the distribution
right, but one subservient to it).
The facts of other cases supported this holding. See, e.g., Neutrogena Corp. v. United
States, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900, 1903 (D.S.C. 1988) (declining to extend § 602's protection to
works manufactured abroad); Hearst Corp. v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970, 972 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(finding a violation of § 602 upon the importation of foreign-made goods); Selchow &
Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp. 19,25 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (same); Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (find-
ing infringement under similar circumstances), aff'd without opinion, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1984). But see Cosmair, Inc. v. Dynamite Enters., Inc., 266 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 344, 346-47
(S.D. Fla. 1985) (using site of sale as the key inquiry when determining a § 602 violation
although the fragrances at issue were American made).
182. BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 (" 'construing § 109(a) as superseding the prohibition
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lowed a Sebastian analysis, it could have held that the sale of the records
abroad extinguished the first sale right.183 Under the Third Circuit's con-
struction, the distribution right extinguishes upon sale because the copy-
right holder has received the value of his work.184 If the distribution right
has extinguished, however, then the protection from unauthorized impor-
tation given in § 602 also expires.' 85 Because of the factual distinction
drawn between the two cases, however, the Ninth Circuit technically
avoided a split with the Third. 186 Yet, their respective constructions logi-
cally cannot coexist.187
B. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc.: Using BMG
Music's Manufacturing Requirement to Circumvent the
Holding in K Mart
The holding in BMG Music seemed particularly well suited to challeng-
ing the sale of identical gray goods admitted into the United States via
the affiliate exception.' 8 Under the Ninth Circuit's construction, a plain-
tiff could attach a copyright to a given product that is manufactured and
sold abroad, and theoretically, that good could not be imported into the
United States without the consent of the U.S. copyright holder.' 89 That
precise factual scenario formed the basis for two subsequent companion
cases: Parfums Givenchy v. Drug Emporium' 90 and Parfums Givenchy v.
C & C Beauty Sales. 9'
In 1991, Givenchy created a box design for one of its perfumes, copy-
on importation set forth in ... § 602 would render § 602 virtually meaningless' ") (quoting
Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49); see also 2 NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.12[B][6] (approving
the Ninth Circuit's construction of § 109).
183. Cf Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099 (finding that the right contained in § 602 does not




186. BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 n.3.
187. See id.; cf. Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd., 664 F. Supp.
909, 918-19 (D.N.J. 1987) (stating that a construction that renders § 109 applicable to every
sale of a work renders § 602 meaningless), vacated, 847 F.2d 1091 (3d Cir. 1988); 2 NiM-
MER, supra note 113, § 8.12[B][6] (reaching a similar conclusion).
188. See BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 (finding that § 602 applies to works produced
abroad); cf. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 286, 298 (1988) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (noting that, in the case of trademark ownership, a foreign trademark owner cannot
avoid the effect of the affiliate exception to § 526 of the Tariff Act by registering its trade-
mark under the name of a United States subsidiary).
189. See BMG Music, 952 F.2d at 319 (finding that § 602 relates to works manufactured
abroad).
190. No. CV-92-4206, 1992 U.S. Dist. WL 532166 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 1992), aff'd, 38
F.3d 477, (9th Cir. 1994), cert. deniei, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995).
191. 832 F. Supp. 1378 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
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righted the design and assigned those rights to its United States distribu-
tor, Givenchy U.S.A.19 2 After spending considerable sums advertising
and marketing the fragrance as a "high prestige luxury item," Givenchy
discovered that C & C Beauty had imported substantial quantities of the
perfume into the United States and had distributed them to retail
stores.193 Givenchy sued C & C Beauty and Drug Emporium for copy-
right infringement under § 602(a), and won an injunction on the lower
court level.
194
192. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1381. C & C Beauty initially challenged Givenchy
U.S.A.'s standing to bring the suit. Id. at 1383. A copyright owner suffers harm only if it
owns the copyright at the time of infringement. Id. at 1384. C & C Beauty's documents
indicated that it acquired the perfume on February 4, 1992. Id. Givenchy U.S.A.'s parent
did not assign the copyright until February 27th. Id. On this basis, C & C Beauty argued
that Givenchy lacked standing to bring the suit. Id.
In rejecting this argument, the court noted that, once the infringing act of importation
has occurred, everyone who distributes the imports also infringes the copyright and may be
enjoined from further distribution. Id. (citing Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v.
Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48-49 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff'd without opinion,
738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.'1984)). As undisputed evidence existed that C & C Beauty distrib-
uted the works after the date of assignment, the court found that Givenchy U.S.A. had
standing to bring the suit.
193. Id. at 1381-82. Unlike the label in Sebastian, which "triled] the limits of the modi-
cum of creativity necessary for a work to be copyrightable," Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Con-
sumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987), vacated, 847 F.2d 1091
(3d Cir. 1988), and which presumably did not involve the promotion of the product, the
district court noted tiat the box design formed "an important part" of the overall Amarige
marketing scheme. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1381.
194. Id. at 1382, 1395; Givenchy, 1992 WL 532166 at *1. In comparing the interaction
between § 602 and § 109, the United States District Court for the Central District of Cali-
fornia relied on the holdings in Scorpio and BMG Music. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1385.
Thus, the district court was bound to construct § 109's limitation on the distribution right as
applying only when the goods are first manufactured and sold within the United States. Id.
Although agreeing with the result reached in those cases, the court questioned the validity
of their rationales in light of the court's own finding that the legislative history of the first
sale doctrine makes no reference to the location of manufacture or sale as a relevant basis
to interpret the phrase "lawfully made under this title." Id. at 1386-88. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1476, supra note 116, at 79 (stating that in order to gain the protection of § 109, "a
copy ... must have been 'lawfully made under this title,' though not necessarily with the
copyright owner's authorization."); see infra notes 230-42 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the legislative history of § 109).
The court's reasoning proceeded from the premise that the first sale doctrine and the
importation right were intended to allow the copyright holder to recover the full value of
each copy sold. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1389; see also Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic
Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir. 1963) (expressing a similar opinion). Section 602,
by prohibiting the importation of unauthorized copies into the United States, ensures that
the demand for an American copy will not decrease because of an increase in the supply of
the work over which the copyright holder has no control. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1390.
The court noted a severe flaw in the Third Circuit's construction of the two sections. The
definition of "full value" is contingent upon on the assumption that the price of the good
will give the copyright holder his full value. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1390. If the copy-
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision, and
further stated that § 602, if interpreted properly, expands the distribution
right by giving it an extraterritorial scope.195 Thus, by preventing the im-
portation of copies sold abroad, § 602 protects the integrity of the
§ 106(3) distribution right beyond United States borders, and ensures
that the copyright holder will-receive the full value of each copy sold on
the American market. 96 Significantly, in upholding the lower court deci-
sion, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected two arguments that had, in dif-
ferent contexts, upheld the gray market's legality.' 97
right holder attempts to penetrate another market by offering his work at a lower price, the
full value of the sale only occurs when the product is actually sold within the foreign mar-
ket. Id.
195. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 479, 481 (9th. Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); cf. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio
Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that a reverse construction
allows § 109(a) an extraterritorial scope), aff'd without opinion, 732 F.2d 424 (3d Cir.
1984).
196. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 481.
197. Id. at 481 n.6. First, the defendant attempted to analogize between § 602 of the
Copyright Act and § 526 of the Tariff Act of 1930. Id. at 483. Drug Emporium requested
that the court distinguish Givenchy from BMG Music because, in Givenchy, the parent
company wholly owned the U.S. distributor. Id. at 482. Unfortunately for the defendant,
neither of the primary reasons for upholding the challenged affiliate exception in K Mart
applied to copyright law. Id. Those reasons, specifically were: 1) the ambiguity of the
statute on its face, and 2) the concern over protecting independent American trademark
owners from foreign competition. Id. at 483-84 (citing K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486
U.S. 281, 297 (1987) (Brennan, J. concurring)). Unlike the statute at issue in K Mart,
neither the plain language nor the legislative history of § 602 indicate a concern with pro-
tecting U.S. businesses from intrabrand competition. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 484 (stating that
"[t]he import restrictions of Copyright Act § 602 were intended to protect U.S. copyright
holders from pirated articles as well as gray market copies, not to give preferential treat-
ment to domestic companies over foreign companies" [footnote omitted]); cf. infra notes
201-29 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)).
Therefore, the court concluded that the existence of an affiliation between the foreign
manufacturer and the U.S. copyright holder bears no relevance to the determination of
liability under § 602. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482-83.
Second, Drug Emporium asked the court to analogize to the affiliate exception it had
recognized in § 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a) (1994). See
NEC Elecs. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th. Cir.) (preventing a wholly
owned subsidiary from invoking the Lanham Act as a basis for preventing importation and
sale of the parent company's product), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 451 (1987). Assuming that the
gray good perfectly mirrors its domestic counterpart, the circulation of its mark in com-
merce cannot infringe the domestic trademark owner's rights. Olympus Corp. v. United
States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 792 F.2d 315 (1986); Coalition to
Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 848 (D.D.C.
1984), aff'd, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. K Mart
Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1987). The picture of the trademark landscape drawn
by the Ninth Circuit appears incomplete. In citing NEC, the court never addressed the
issue of material difference raised by the Lever and Nestle decisions. See Givenchy, 38
F.3d at 481 (omitting any such discussion); cf supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text
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The Ninth Circuit again avoided direct conflict with the Third Circuit's
Sebastian decision by taking great pains to state that the result in
Givenchy merely followed the holding of BMG Music, both of which
were limited to their respective facts.19 8 Unlike the shampoo at issue in
Sebastian, the plaintiff's product was manufactured outside the United
States, and hence enjoyed a legally protected status.199 As discussed be-
low, the legislative history of both of these provisions tends to support the
Ninth Circuit's position. 0°
III. IMPORTATION RIGHTS AND THE FIRST SALE DOCTRINE UNDER
THE COPYRIGHT LAW
A. The Development of the Importation Right Under § 602
Before reaching its final form, the language that became § 602 went
through an exhaustive revision process.2 0' Between 1961 and 1964, the
Copyright Office produced a tentative draft and solicited comments from
interested parties, resulting in the introduction of draft legislation in
(discussing the Lever and Nestle decisions). Those cases specifically held that no affiliate
exception to the prior sections of the Lanham Act exists when the imported goods differ
from those sold by the United States trademark owner; in essence, recognizing the princi-
ple for which Katzel is more often cited: that trademarks are territorial. Lever Bros. v.
United States, 981 F.2d 1330, 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Therefore, although the Ninth Cir-
cuit's categorical assertion that an affiliate exception to § 43(a) and § 32 exists may reflect
the state of the law in the Ninth Circuit, it may not reflect the trend of jurisprudence in the
rest of the country. Cf. Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d
633, 641 (1st Cir. 1992) (barring importation of materially different goods); Lever, 981 F.2d
at 1338 (holding similarly).
The court found that the reason for an affiliate exception under the Lanham Act-
namely, to protect the investment of the United States trademark owner from brand con-
fusion-did not apply to copyright. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 485. In this respect, the purpose
of these two provisions parallels that of § 526 of the Tariff Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1994).
See K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 287 (1988) discussed supra notes 59-86 and
accompanying text (describing the protective function of § 526). On the contrary, Con-
gress most likely intended § 602 to protect the U.S. copyright holder against unauthorized
imports, regardless of their source. Id.; see also infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text
(discussing the legislative history of § 602).
198. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482 n.8, 484.
199. Id. at 479. Dicta in the opinion, however, suggests that a split with the Third Cir-
cuit may loom on the horizon. Although limiting the holding to the facts of BMG Music,
the court stated its disapproval with Sebastian, which makes the site of manufacture the
crucial fact on which the existence of first sale protection turns and which effectively ren-
ders § 602 meaningless. Id. at 481-82.
200. See infra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (describing the legislative history of
§ 602).
201. In 1955, Congress appropriated funds for thirty-five monographs on what they
thought were the significant aspects of the copyright law. See generally H.R. REP No.
1476, supra note 116, at 1-3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5660-63 (describing the
revision on a bill by bill basis).
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1964.2o2 In light of the comments received on that particular piece of
legislation, the Copyright Office revised the bill again before its re-intro-
duction in 1965.203 From 1965 until its enactment in 1976, the thrust of
the language of § 602(a), relating to the lawfulness of the importation of
copies acquired abroad, did not substantially change.2"4 The legislative
history of § 602 suggests that Congress intended to implement a separate
importation restriction that would not expire merely because a company
first sold the work abroad.2 °5
Initially, in 1961, the Register did not mention imposing liability for the
unauthorized importation of lawfully made copyrighted works; in fact,
the Register of Copyright opposed it.2°6 During a 1963 panel discussion
of the Register's report, however, the possibility of unauthorized, but
202. H.R. 11947, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964); S. 3008, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (by
request).
203. H.R. 4347, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); S. 1006, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965).
204. See infra notes 217-68 and accompanying text (describing the development of this
language). Section (b), however, underwent numerous changes between its introduction
and enactment. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1994) (giving Customs the power to prevent
the importation of piratical works, but failing to authorize them to detain works lawfully
made with the authorization of the U.S. copyright holder) with PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (PART 3), ALTERNATIVE A AND ALTERNATIVE B § 44(b) (1963)
(prescribing a procedure, in the case of Alternative A, by which the American copyright
holder may receive notice of a potentially infringing importation, but placing no burden on
Customs to bar the import), reprinted in 6 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT
420 (1984). Alternative B, in contrast, prohibited piratical works only. Id.
Over the years, Congress ultimately prohibited the importation of pirated copies and
those produced in violation of the Act's manufacturing requirement. See H.R. 11947,
supra note 202, § 44(b) (only prohibiting importation of piratical copies); H.R. 4347, supra
note 203, § 602(b) (only allowing Customs to prevent importation when the imports violate
the manufacturing provision); see also 17 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (using the same language as
H.R. 4347).
205. See materials cited supra notes 145-47 (describing Congress' treatment of manu-
facturing requirements), as well as the discussion contained infra notes 207-27 and accom-
panying text (addressing the development of § 602).
206. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 1: REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN-
ERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 126 (Comm. Print 1961). The Register saw
no reason to "impose the territorial restriction in a private contract on a third person with
no knowledge of the agreement." Id. The Register initially only recommended that the
new act bar "piratical copies" and grant the Treasury department the power to stop the
goods at the border. Cf. id. at Chapter X, § C.
4. Recommendations .... b. The prohibition in section 106 [of the 1909 act]
against importation of 'piratical copies'-i.e., copies made without the authoriza-
tion of the author or any other copyright owner-should be retained in substance.
c. The provision of section 109 [of the 1909 act], authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury and the Postmaster General to prescribe rules and regulations for the
enforcement of the import restrictions, should be retained in substance.
reprinted in KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 204, at 420.
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non-piratical importation arose.2 °7 Publishing and music industry repre-
sentatives noted that the proposal would not cover copies of a book or
song licensed for manufacture abroad, sold and then imported.208 They
further recommended that Congress grant Customs the power to block
those goods at the border.20 9
In response to these concerns, the Copyright Office drafted two alter-
native provisions containing identical language prohibiting unauthorized
importation.210 The 1964 panel discussion surrounding the preliminary
207. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 1ST. SESS., COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 2: DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER
OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 212-15, 232,
235, 327 (Comm. Print 1963).
208. Id. at 212. Horace Manges, speaking for the American Book Publisher's Council,
posed the hypothetical of a U.S. book publisher that acquired the exclusive right to print a
given work in the U.S. Id. The distribution of an English edition in the United States
market harms the rights of the U.S. copyright owner. Id. Under the proposed provisions
at that time, however, the U.S. copyright holder would have to demonstrate that the books
in question were both illegally manufactured and imported, which it could not do. Id.
Although the U.S. producer could theoretically sue the English firm for breach of contract,
the copyright law gave the U.S. printer or distributor no protection from this practice. Id.
at 213. A music industry representative pointed out, initially, that a copyrighted item could
be imported without ever infringing the contract rights of the U.S. copyright owner, be-
cause the foreign publisher could sell it to a third party, who will then import it. Id. at 212.
The representatives of both the publishing industry and the American Bar Association's
Committee on the Program for Revision of the Copyright Law therefore conceded that the
unauthorized importation of a non-piratical work did not fall squarely within the definition
of piratical copy, but argued that it should constitute an infringement nonetheless. See id.
209. Id. In response to these arguments, the Register took definite position, but he did
note that the enforcement of the provision would place a substantial burden on the Cus-
toms Service. Id. at 214. The Register added that the same problem of legitimate copies
being imported without authorization turned up in the context of artificial flowers carrying
a design copyright. Id.
210. PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW (PART 3), § 44 ALTERNATIVE A
AND § 44 ALTERNATIVE B (1963) (providing that "Importation into the United States of
copies or records of a work for the purpose'of distribution to the public shall, if such
articles are imported without the authority of the owner of the exclusive right to distribute
copies or records under this title, constitute an infringement of copyright..."), reprinted in
6 KAMINSTEIN LEGISLATIVE HISTORY PROJECT, supra note 204, at 421.
The two alternatives only differed with respect to the powers given to Customs to stop
infringing importation at the border. Id. Part (b) of Alternative A gave Customs the au-
thority only to prescribe a procedure by which the American copyright holder could be
notified of a possible infringing importation, piratical or otherwise, Upon the payment of a
specified fee; it did not give them any "right or obligation to prevent such importation."
Id. In contrast, Alternative B expressly denied Customs the authority to prevent importa-
tion of "lawfully made articles," but barred the importation of articles if their production
would have constituted an infringement. Id. Alternative B gave Customs the power to
notify the U.S. copyright holder of a possible infringing importation in either case. The
substance of alternative B survived the entire revision process. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 602(b)
(1994) (providing for a procedure by which the United States copyright holder may receive
notice of an infringing importation). The language drafted by the Copyright Office ap-
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drafts more fully addressed the concerns raised in 1963, but again did not
reach any definite conclusion.211 The Copyright Office, however, took
the position that the draft language made the unauthorized importation
of copies for distribution an infringement.
2 12
During the 1964 panel discussion, the question arose as to the limits of
the importation provision's protection.213 A publishing industry repre-
sentative posited a hypothetical transaction in which an American im-
porter buys books from a German jobber, who had bought them from a
German publisher licensed to print the book.2 14 The Copyright Office
responded that anyone who imports without authority into the United
States has infringed; therefore, the importer is an infringer.215 The repre-
sentative then expanded the hypothetical, asking if a bookseller, after
purchasing the infringing books from the importer, would also face liabil-
ity for infringement.216 In responding, the Copyright Office framed the
issue currently before the courts: if the sale of a copyrighted work extin-
guishes the right to control further distribution, does it also extinguish the
right to prevent importation which is also part of that distribution
right?2" 7 Unfortunately, the Copyright Office never answered this
question.
The next draft of the legislation incorporated substantial changes from
pears to incorporate the concerns of the panelists mentioned in 1963, as well as the diffi-
culty of enforcing such a provision. See supra note 208 (mentioning the difficulty of
enforcing such a provision); cf. supra note 27 (stating the rule proposal given by COPIAT
to implement the materially different standard).
211. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2D. SESS., COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4, FURTHER DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY
DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 203-04 (Comm. Print 1964) [hereinafter Dis-
CUSSIONS, PART 4]. The broad language of the section referring to all works did draw some
objection. Mr. Kaye of Broadcast Music suggested that exceptions for certain works ex-
isted, such as those intended for use in libraries, and works in Braille for the use of the
blind. Id. at 205. This suggestion appears in the final version of the statute as 17 U.S.C.
§ 602(b)(1), (2) (1994).
212. DISCUSSIONS, PART 4, supra note 211, at 203-04.
213. Id. at 210.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 211.
217. Id. at 211-12 (stating that the application of the rule raises the question whether
the sale of the work abroad exhausts the importation right). Cf. Parfums Givenchy, Inc., v.
C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1386 (C.D. Ca. 1993) (addressing the same
issue, and finding that it does not when the good is manufactured abroad, but finding that
analysis troubling); BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding simi-
larly), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206 (1992); Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY),
Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1098 (3d. Cir. 1988) (same); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Scor-
pio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same), aff'd without opinion,
738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
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the previous year. None of the 1965 revisions touch directly on the con-
flict with the first sale doctrine, but they do raise an inference that Con-
gress did not intend to limit the § 602 importation right.218  The
accompanying report of the Copyright Office stated that the rights of the
American copyright holder would be infringed if a work, authorized for
distribution abroad, appears in the United States.219 Congress added lan-
guage distinguishing educationally related importation from that made
for "private gain. "220 The House Judiciary Committee report accompa-
nying this bill deleted the reference to "private gain" and replaced it gen-
eral language stating that an unauthorized importation constitutes an
infringement, subject to exceptions for educational, personal, and reli-
gious use.22 1 By carving out specific exceptions to the importation provi-
218. H.R. 4347, § 602, 89th Congress, 1st Sess. (1965). Unlike its predecessors, the bill
exempted scholarly, educational, and religious institutions from the importation restriction
if the institution intended to use the article as part of its library. Id. at § 602 (a). Second,
the administrative concerns over Customs' capacity to deal with infringing imports resulted
in the insertion of language categorically exempting lawfully made goods from exclusion at
the border. Id. § 602(b) (stating that Customs has no authority to prevent the importation
of lawfully made copies or phonorecords unless the importation unless the manufacturing
provisions of § 601 apply). Finally, as a minor detail, the section numbers used in the U.S.
Code first made appeared at this point. Compare, e.g., id. with H.R. 11,347, § 44.
219. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS. COPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 6, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW 149-50 (Comm. Print
1965) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6]. The report stated:
In the second situation covered by section 602, the copies.., were lawfully made
but their distribution in the United States would violate the exclusive rights of the
U.S. copyright owner. This would occur, for example, where the copyright owner
had authorized the making of copies in a foreign country for distribution only in
that country.
Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 149.
221. H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 168-69 (1966). "The mere act of importa-
tion in this situation would constitute an act of infringement and could be enjoined." Id.
at 168. See also supra note 218 (discussing the religious and educational exceptions to
H.R. 4347).
The report states that with regard to lawfully made articles, the mere act of unauthorized
importation is an infringement. Id. at 167. Congress did not appear to care how a given
work came into the country, or where its intended distribution took place, only that it did
so with consent. See id. at 167-68 (expressing Congress' intent to make unauthorized im-
portation an infringement); H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 170 (stating that § 602
is intended to cover the situation where copies are lawfully produced, and that "the mere
act of importation in this situation is an infringement and could be enjoined"), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5786. But see COPYRIGHT REVISION, PART 6, supra note 219 at
149 (stating that infringement occurs not at importation, but when the work is actually
distributed). The panelists' concerns with the inadequacy of a contract remedy to help the
American copyright holder to recoup any losses he may suffer from unauthorized importa-
tion, see supra notes 201-07 (discussing this concern), may well have motivated Congress to
switch the act of infringement from distribution to importation.
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sion, Congress clarified the section and further strengthened the
inference that § 602 does not expire upon the sale of a work abroad.222
From 1967 onward, the language of § 602(a)'s restriction of unauthor-
ized importation did not substantively change.22 3 The gist of the testi-
mony before the Judiciary Committee during earlier revisions addressed
the harm done by the importation of works first sold abroad. 2 4 Indeed,
the record suggests that this concern motivated the section's inclusion. 2 5
Furthermore, the use of the word "acquired" in the text of § 602 also
supports the idea that Congress intended the first sale defense to be com-
pletely inapplicable with regard to the legality of an importation. 2 6
Thus, the lack of substantial changes in the reports and the language of
the legislation leads to the nearly inescapable conclusion that the sale of a
222. H.R. 4347, § 602(a), 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) (as reported by the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary). The reported version stated that "Importation into the United
States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under this title, of copies or pho-
norecords of a work that have been acquired abroad is an infringement of the exclusive
right to distribute copies ...under section 106, actionable under section 501." Id.
Although not providing a direct resolution of the issue of parallel importation, the addition
and deletion of this language adds some credence to the theory that the 602 right exists
independently of § 109. See id. § 602(a)(3) (stating that § 602 does not apply to "importa-
tion by an organization operated for scholarly ... purposes and not for private gain").
223. See H.R. 2512, § 602(a), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The House Judiciary Com-
mittee reported version contained no changes, nor did the report itself give any substantial
hints as to its interaction with § 109. See H.R. 2512, § 602(a), 90th Cong., 1st Sess., (1967)
(as reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary); cf H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong.,
1st. Sess. 138-39 (1967) (omitting any such reference). The language of section (a) would
not change again until 1976, when the Committee substituted the phrase "acquired outside
the United States" for the phrase "acquired abroad." Compare S. 543 § 602(a), 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1969); S. 644, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S. 1361, § 602(a), 91st Cong, 1st Sess.
(1973); S. 1361, § 602(a), 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) (as reported by Committee on the
Judiciary); S. 22, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (as reported) with S. 22, § 602(a), 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., (1976) (as reported by the House Committee on the Judiciary) (containing the
phrase acquired "abroad" instead of the phrase "outside the United States"). The report
language also substituted the former phrase for the latter. Compare H.R. REP. No. 1476,
supra note 116, at 69-70 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5785-86 with S. REP.
No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1974).
224. See supra note 221 (describing the changes in the statute during this time period)
and notes 201-16 and accompanying text (illustrating the industry concerns prompting the
section's introduction).
225. See supra notes 207-217 and accompanying text (describing the concerns prompt-
ing the drafting of § 602).
226. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994) (referring to works "acquired abroad"). It also,
however, casts doubt on the importance of the site of manufacture as the determining
factor in infringement suits brought under § 602. Cf. supra notes 141-98 and accompanying
text (discussing the judiciary's focus on manufacture in addressing the application of
§ 602); see also supra notes 145-46 (discussing the copyright law's manufacturing require-
ments). The deletion of the language distinguishing importation for "private gain," see
supra note 219, further suggests that the first sale doctrine would not protect parallel im-
portations for a commercial purpose.
1996] Gray Market Goods and Copyright Law
work abroad does not destroy the United States copyright owner's right
to prevent importation. 2 7
More importantly, for the intellectual property owner seeking to ham-
string gray market sales of its products, the legislative history of § 602
never refers to an exemption for goods embodying a copyrighted work
held by an affiliate of the foreign copyright owner. 2 8 Instead, it seems to
enhance the copyright law's attractiveness as a potential seal on the hole
created by K Mart v. Cartier.
22 9
B. The First Sale Doctrine Under § 109
Although the history of the importation provision became quite com-
plex, that of the first sale doctrine embodied in § 109 is startlingly simple,
and follows naturally from the common law's antipathy for restrictions on
the alienation of property.23° Section 109 of the Copyright Act of 1976
limits the right of the copyright holder to control the distribution 231 of a
work once the first sale has been made,232 and arose directly out of Con-
gress' desire to codify the Supreme Court's decision in Bobbs-Merrill v.
Straus 233
Bobbs-Merrill claimed it had the power to control the price of subse-
quent sales through the exclusive right to vend as granted by the copy-
right statute then in force,234 but the Supreme Court disagreed.235
227. See supra notes 201-09, 219-21 (describing testimony by the Copyright office to
this effect, as well as bill and report language). Admittedly, the legislative history does not
define at what point the unauthorized importation of a work, after being sold several times,
ceases to become an infringement. See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text (describ-
ing this dilemma). However, courts have interpreted the statute as only barring wholesale
importation. Hearst v. Stark, 639 F. Supp. 970, 976 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (holding that the
plural language of § 602 renders it applicable only to wholesale importation).
228. See supra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (omitting any discussion of an affili-
ate exception to § 602).
229. 486 U.S. 281,290-91 (1988); see supra notes 62-86 and accompanying text (describ-
ing the K Mart decision).
230. See White v. Brown, 559 S.W.2d 938 (Tenn. 1977) (rendering void a clause in a will
prohibiting the legatee from selling the willed real estate).
231. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (1994) (enumerating the distribution right).
232. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994).
233. 210 U.S. 339 (1908). In Bobbs-Merrill, the American Publisher's Association at-
tempted to enforce a minimum retail price per copy of a book by appending each volume's
copyright notice with the following statement: "'The price of this book at retail is one
dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less[er] price, and a sale at a less[er] price will
be treated as an infringement of the copyright.' " Id. at 341. The dispute arose when
Macy's bought the books from a wholesaler at a price below that stated in the notice, and
in turn sold them at eighty nine cents per copy. Id. at 342. Bobbs-Merrill then sued both
Straus (the wholesaler) and Macy's.
234. Id. at 340 (describing the publisher's argument that the statute in question vested
the whole field of exclusive rights in the copyright owner, and that the copyright owner
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Because the function of the copyright statute centered around securing
the right to multiply copies of a work, the Court flatly rejected this con-
struction as beyond the statute's intended ambit.236 Congress promptly
codified the result in Bobbs-Merrill, and although disagreement existed
over the precise wording of the legislation during its drafting, the princi-
ple embodied in the decision was never challenged.237
may part with it to another to the extent that it desires, while withholding via contract as
much of the right as it pleases); cf 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). See Copyright Act of 1891, ch.
565, § 4952, 26 Stat. 1107 (stating that ". . .[the author, inventor ... or assigns of any such
person shall ... have the sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing ... and vending").
235. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 351.
236. Id. at 350 (commenting that the copyright statutes, although protecting the copy-
right holder's rights to multiply and sell his production, do not give it the right to impose a
price limitation on future purchasers).
237. See NIMMER, supra note 113, § 8.12[A] (stating that Congress intended the first
sale doctrine to further the common law policy against restrictions on alienation and re-
straints of trade). The first sale doctrine was embodied as § 41 of the 1909 Act. 35 Stat.
1075, 1084 (1909). See also ARGUMENTS ON COMMON LAW RIGHTS As APPLIED TO COPY-
RIGHT, BEFORE THE COPYRIGHT SUBCOMMIITEE ON THE HOUSE COMM. ON PATENTS, 62d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1909) (statement of William Jenner) (describing the control sought by the
publishers in Bobbs-Merrill, if allowed, as an "intolerable condition"), reprinted in 5 BRY-
LAWSKI AND GOLDMAN, supra note 129, at 16; id. at 36 (noting that the arrangement in
Bobbs-Merrill attempting to fix all future transfers of a book was invalidated in state court
on a contract theory as being in restraint of trade) (statement of Mr. Parkinson). The
panel wanted the statute's language specific enough to prevent the authorization of any
similar collusive agreement. Id. at 35.
In the report accompanying the 1909 act, Congress unequivocally stated that it wished to
extinguish the copyright holder's control over disposition of a given work after the first sale
is made. H.R. REP. No. 2222, supra note 129, at S19. In discussing § 30 of the Act, the
committee reasoned that "it would be most unwise to permit the copyright proprietor to
exercise any control whatever over the article ... once said proprietor has made the first
sale." Id. The rationale behind the Committee's language is, simply, that once the first
sale has been made at a satisfactory price, the function of the limited monopoly has been
served. See also Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d Cir.
1963) (describing the rationale behind the first sale doctrine similarly).
Although Congress made changes to the wording of the statute when enacting the next
major revision in 1976, it did not intend to change the meaning of the statutory provision
on this point. See Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (stating that
nothing in the Copyright Act should restrict the transfer of a lawfully obtained work).
Although some issues arose as to what constituted vending within the meaning of the stat-
ute, see Platt & Munk, 315 F.2d at 852, Congress crafted the 1976 provision so that it would
eliminate any confusion about the nature of a valid sale. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 5:1964 REVI-
SION BILL WITH DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS 66 (Comm. Print 1965). Finally, the words
"under this title" were added to ensure that the Copyright Act formed the basis for deter-
mining the meaning of this section. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1975);' H.R.
REP. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1967); S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d. Sess. 123 (1974).
The report accompanying the 1976 Act stated that "Section 109(a) restates and confirms
the principle that, where the copyright owner has transferred ownership of a particular
copy of a work, the person to whom the copy is transferred is entitled to dispose of it by
sale, rental, or any other means." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 79 (emphasis
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The concerns over restraints of trade underlying the first sale doctrine
do not warrant its application to the sale of copyrighted works abroad.238
Antitrust law generally concerns itself with interbrand competition, and
preventing one purveyor of goods or services from stifling the competi-
tive workings of the market.239 Elimination of gray market imports only
protects a domestic copyright owner from competing against copies of its
own work.240 Assuming that the copyright owner is a rational economic
actor, if an increased supply of his work through other channels would
have earned greater profits, he would have probably taken those steps
already.241 Therefore, the concerns over resale price maintenance that
fostered the codification of the first sale doctrine do not apply to the gray
market scenario.242
added), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5693. Indeed, the report directly refers to the
facts of Bobbs-Merrill. See id. (stating that "[t]hus, for example, the outright sale of an
authorized copy of a book frees it from any copyright control over its resale price or other
conditions of its future distribution"); see also Stephen W. Feingold, Note, Parallel Import-
ing Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 113, 128-32 (1984)
(describing the enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 109 in detail).
The underlying rationale reflected in the legislative history of § 109, therefore, is the
Congressional policy of discouraging anticompetitive business behavior. Cf. The Sherman
Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (outlawing every agreement in restraint of trade);
United States v. Addyson Pipe and Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 294-95 (6th Cir. 1898) (striking
down a horizontal price fixing arrangement as violative of antitrust principles), modified,
175 U.S. 211 (1899). Even if no collusive agreement between the publishers existed, the
kind of resale price maintenance sought via the copyright notice constituted a per se viola-
tion of the antitrust laws. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S.
373, 405 (1911) (stating that a vertical agreement which attempts to impose retail prices on
a third party is void under the Sherman Act). Had the publishers in Bobbs-Merrill won,
they could have controlled the price of books all the way down the chain of sale. Bobbs-
Merrill, 210 U.S. at 340-41. Horizontal price fixing arrangements, such as the one the
American publishers attempted to impose, produce a net loss of both productive output
and efficiency. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 107-09 (1978). Thus, the
consumer is worse off because the output of a given good will fall, but no resources will be
re-allocated to other sectors of the economy. Horizontal agreements result in a reduction
in output (because demand will fall), but does not cause any reallocation of resources in
the economy. Id. at 108.
238. See supra notes 226-37 (describing the policy driving the enactment of § 109).
239. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (stating
that "fi]nterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same
generic product ... and is the primary concern of antitrust law").
240. See LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that intrabrand competition in-
jures distribution networks).
241. BORK, supra note 237, at 289; LEXECON STUDY, supra note 5, at 18-19.
242. Cf. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55. Indeed, some measure of restriction is necessary
to operate any kind of business, as it allows the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies
in distribution. Id. at 54; see also BORK, supra note 237, at 135 (stating that the adoption of
business associations between individuals is an agreement not to compete).
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IV. THE IMPORTATION RESTRICTION CONTAINED IN THE COPYRIGHT
ACT, IF PROPERLY INTERPRETED, PROVIDES AN END RUN
AROUND THE K MART HOLDING
A. Construction of the Two Sections
As the law now stands, the site of manufacture has become crucial in
determining whether the first sale doctrine will excuse an otherwise in-
fringing importation.243 Such a requirement, however, does not appear in
the statute or the legislative history.244 When Congress intends the site
of manufacture to be relevant, it has said so explicitly.245 Regardless of
the cause of this conflict, however, a court faced with this juxtaposition
must find a way to resolve it without rendering either section
surplusage.
246
The plain language of each statute leaves two possible constructions.
First, as construed by the Third Circuit, § 109 limits the distribution right
granted by § 106(3).247 Because an importation violates only the distribu-
tion right, and the distribution right is extinguished by the first sale, then
the importation right must also be extinguished by the first sale.248 That
extinction will occur irrespective of either the situs of the sale or manu-
facture of a given copy.
249
The Third Circuit analysis, if taken to its logical conclusion, renders the
243. Compare Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 480 (9th
Cir. 1994) (finding that the unauthorized importation of works lawfully made abroad in-
fringes an American copyright), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995) with Sebastian Int'l,
Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY), Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding no
infringement when a work is made in the United States).
244. See 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994); supra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing the legislative history of the importation provision).
245. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 164, 169, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5780, 5785; see also supra notes 145-46 (discussing the Copyright Act's
manufacturing provisions).
246. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995) (stating that a reviewing
court should avoid a construction that renders the words of a statute superfluous); United
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 35 (1992) (stating that a statute should be con-
strued to give meaning to it in its entirety); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of
Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985) (stating that courts should not interpret a statute so as
to render one part inoperative); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609,
633 (1973) (stating that it is axiomatic that all parts of an Act "if at all possible, are to be
given effect"); see also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (stating that the
Supreme Court considers statutes not as component parts, but as a whole).
247. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099.
248., Id.
249. Id. at 1098. The court noted that the manufacturing requirements imposed by
Scorpio and its progeny have no basis in the legislative history. Id.; see also supra notes
201-29 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of § 602). Although ex-
plicitly declining to pass on the validity of the phrase "lawfully made under this title," id.,
the court found the judicially created manufacturing requirements "troubling." Id. at 1098
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provisions of § 602 meaningless. Under the analytical framework of Se-
bastian, a third party could exploit the American market merely by
purchasing the copyrighted item abroad.25° The legislative history of the
importation provision strongly suggests that such a result falls beyond the
pale of Congressional intent.251 The reasoning in Sebastian makes the
result in BMG Music a logical impossibility, as the sale of the works
abroad would have extinguished the domestic copyright holder's distribu-
tion rights.252 Like K Mart, the decision in Sebastian arguably involved
the ramifications of shutting down a multimillion dollar business more
than construing the plain language of the statutes.253 Unlike the K Mart
decision, however, Sebastian violated one of the main tenets of statutory
construction: that no part of a statute should be interpreted so as to make
another part superfluous.254
Another, and perhaps more important, criticism of the Third Circuit's
construction of these sections is that it gives extraterritorial effect to
§ 109.255 Absent express congressional intent, domestic laws are pre-
n.1; cf supra notes 145-46, 47 (discussing Congress' expression of intent regarding manu-
facturing requirements).
250. Id. at 1097-98.
251. See supra notes 201-27 and accompanying text.
252. BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1206
(1992). As discussed earlier, the Ninth Circuit distinguished this case from Sebastian on
the basis of the place where the goods are manufactured. Id. at 319 n.3. In Givenchy, the
Ninth circuit again managed to avoid a split between it and the Third Circuit by reaffirming
the same distinction. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 482
n.7, 8 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995). This is distinction without a
difference.
253. Sebastian, 847 F.2d at 1099. The court stated:
[A]lthough this case turns purely on copyright issues, we recognize that the un-
derlying "gray market," or "parallel importing," issues really are dominant...
[The failure of other remedies] has created the anomalous situation in which the
dispute at hand superficially targets a product's label, but in reality rages over the
product itself. We think that the controversy ... should [not] be resolved by
judicial extension of the Copyright Act's limited monopoly.
Id. The Sebastian decision parallels K Mart in the sense that neither reviewing court had a
desire to put the gray market out of business via judicial fiat. Cf. K Mart Corp. v. Cartier,
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 295 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting the emergence of a "mul-
tibillion dollar industry" around parallel imports).
254. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1069 (1995) (stating that a reviewing
court should avoid a construction that renders words superfluous); United States v. Nordic
Village, 503 U.S. 30, 36 (1992) (stating that a statute should be construed to give every
word some operative effect); Mountain States & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S.
237, 249 (1985); Weinberger v. Hynson, Wescott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609, 633 (1973) (stat-
ing that it is axiomatic that all parts of an Act "if at all possible, must be given effect"); see
also United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984) (stating that the Supreme Court
considers statutes not as component parts, but as a whole).
255. See Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F.
Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (stating that allowing sales abroad to extinguish the distribu-
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sumed not to apply outside the United States. 56 By allowing the sale
abroad to extinguish the importation right, the Third Circuit's construc-
tion attaches domestic legal significance to an event that occurs outside
the borders of the United States. 57 Such extraterritorial recognition
would violate the "undisputed axiom" of copyright law-that it has no
extraterritorial application.
25 8
These two sections offer an alternative construction, however. Section
602 states that the importation of works that have been "acquired outside
the United States" without the consent of the United States copyright
holder infringes the distribution right granted in § 106.259 If Congress in-
tended the Copyright Act to have no extraterritorial application, then,
contrary to what the Ninth Circuit concluded in Givenchy,260 the distribu-
tion right of § 106(3) does not exist outside the United States and hence
tion right gives the distribution right an extraterritorial effect), aff'd without opinion, 738
F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
256. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (stating that legisla-
tion applies only within the boundaries of the United States unless Congress has mani-
fested a contrary intent) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
257. See Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49 (stating that allowing sales abroad to extinguish the
distribution right gives the distribution right an extraterritorial effect).
258. Subafilms Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir.
1994); Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657,662 (2d Cir. 1955). In
theory, if the distribution right can be extinguished outside the United States, then it fol-
lows that it must exist. If it exists, then it can be infringed outside the United States.
The reasons for this rule against extraterritorial application center around maintaining
the United States' international obligations with respect to copyright and other intellectual
property agreements. Subafilm, 24 F.3d at 1097. The central theme of these agreements is
national treatment-each country must provide a foreign author the same protection it
provides its own nationals. Subafilm, 24 F.3d at 1097; cf The Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 5(1) (requiring signatories to accord na-
tional treatment to qualifying works), entered into force, March 1, 1989, reprinted in
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION
ON LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) Appendix (1978); Final Text, Uru-
guay Round Trade Agreements, Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 1(3) (requiring member states to accord national treatment and to
adhere to most of Berne), reprinted in MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, THE URUGUAY ROUND TRADE AGREEMENTS, H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong.,
2d. Sess 1627 (1994). In addition to raising issues of national treatment, extraterritorial
application of the Copyright Act may offend other signatories to these agreements "by
effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previously it was assumed to gov-
ern." Subafilm, 24 F.3d at 1097. The extraterritorial application of copyright law could
also send a message to other nations that the U.S. does not trust their enforcement. mecha-
nisms as adequate. Id. at 1098. In contrast, by keeping the effect of the Act within U.S.
territory, the courts not only avoid creating strife between the U.S. and other nations, but
also avoid difficult choice of law decisions that would otherwise arise. See id. (describing
the choice of law problem).
259. 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (1994).
260. Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1315 (1995); see also Subafilms, 24 F.3d at 1095.
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cannot expire.261 Section 602 makes unauthorized importation of a work
an infringement of the American copyright holder's right to distribute
*262Th inrcopies. The infringement of the § 106(3) distribution right therefore
occurs within United States borders.263
Considering the circumstances surrounding § 109's development, the
261. See Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1386
(C.D. Cal. 1993) (confining the existence of the distribution right to within the United
States).
262. See id.
263. Cf 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of
the copyright owner... [delineated in §§ 106-118, 602] is an infringer..." (emphasis ad-
ded)). The report accompanying § 501 states that "an unauthorized importation of copies
or phonorecords acquired abroad is an infringement of the exclusive right of distribution
under certain circumstances." H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 158, reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5774. The words "certain circumstances" might mean 'except when
the imported copies were first sold abroad.' However, the presence of 602's exceptions for
imports destined for educational, governmental, or personal use, 17 U.S.C. § 602(b) (1994),
makes it more likely that the phrase "under certain circumstances" means 'when sections
602(a) (1), (2) and (3) do not apply.'
In computing the measure of statutory damages, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994) allows the
court to reduce the minimum amount of damages awarded to as little as $100, in cases
involving innocent infringement. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (1994) (stating that when the
infringer lacks any knowledge or reason to know that his acts constituted a copyright in-
fringement, statutory damages may total as little as $100). The gray marketer, however,
cannot afford to admit any liability at all because the practice in that line of business is to
obscure the chain of title and because the marketer probably knows that the goods are
present in the U.S. against the wishes of the manufacturer. See Osawa & Co. v. B & H
Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1166 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (gray market retailer refused to give
name of importer and therefore was found the importer as a matter of law); Johnson &
Johnson Prods., Inc. v. DAL Int'l Trading Co., 798 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting the
gray market practice of ripping shipping labels from boxes). The innocent infringer provi-
sion of § 504(c)(2) should therefore offer the gray marketer little solace.
Although infringement technically occurs upon the unauthorized importation of a copy-
righted work, see supra note 219 (describing Congress' decision to make importation
rather than distribution the act of infringement), as a practical matter the harm to the
copyright holder occurs when the work enters the domestic market and disrupts his mo-
nopoly therein. Cf. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 480 n.2 (stating that the Copyright Act protects
copyright holders from unauthorized importation and from the distribution of unauthor-
ized imports). The monopoly of copyright law is intended to reward each copyright holder
for the value of each copy. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 428-31
(1984). One question left unanswered by these cases is whether courts should use a subjec-
tive or objective standard in determining the "value" of a copyrighted work. If subjective,
then § 109 cannot trump § 602 because, if a manufacturer would sell its goods abroad at a
loss or deflated price in order to penetrate a foreign market, the importation and subse-
quent domestic sale of those goods denies him the expected value of his bargain. See
Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1390-91 (stating that, in addition to price, the value of a sale to
the seller may involve its location). If value is objective, then the mere receipt of money by
the copyright holder could theoretically satisfy the value requirement. Cf id. Ideally, the
two strands would be combined so that a reviewing body would consider the subjective
strand (what the manufacturer expected) and the objective strand (whether the manufac-
turer's actions belie his stated expectation).
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first sale doctrine should not limit liability under § 602.264 As the facts of
Bobbs-Merrill indicate, Congress designed § 109 to further the free alien-
ation of property, and to prevent resale price maintenance. 65 This prob-
lem does not occur in the gray market scenario because irrespective of its
effect abroad, § 109 as applied in the United States unequivocally pre-
vents the copyright holder from controlling future transfers of a copy.
2 66
Section 602's prohibition protects the copyright holder from the
equivalent of intrabrand competition, a result consistent not only with the
intended scope the Copyright Act,267 but also well within that of the anti-
trust laws.
268
B. The Implications of a Proper Construction of this Split on the Gray
Market
Espousal of the Givenchy holding in other Circuits could significantly
constrict the sale of gray goods in the United States. The appearance of
identical gray goods on the domestic market when the United States
owner has an affiliation with the foreign trademark registrant does not
implicate either the trademark law's concern with consumer confusion
269
or the protectionist concern over the goodwill of the United States trade-
mark holder that upheld Customs' interpretation of the Tariff Act. 7 °
The Lanham Act only ignores affiliations if the gray market goods mate-
rially differ from those sold by the United States trademark holder. 71
The purpose of the trademark law and that of copyright law, as the
Court in Givenchy noted, differ completely.272 Nowhere in the legislative
264. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 116, at 79 (discussing the first sale provision,
and making no mention of a negative effect on § 602), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5693.
265. See supra notes 230-37 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of
§ 109).
266. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1994). Cf. Givenchy, 832 F. Supp. at 1386 (illustrating the ef-
fect that gray market importation has on the U.S. intellectual property owner); see also
supra notes 43-58 and accompanying text (describing the nature of the gray market).
267. See supra notes 201-29 (discussing the legislative history of § 602).
268. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) (noting
that "[i]nterbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of the same
generic product... and is the primary concern of antitrust law"). See also BORK, supra
note 239, at 288-91 (arguing for the legality of all vertical restraints, including those involv-
ing price).
269. See supra notes 88-109 and accompanying text (discussing the Lever and Nestle
decisions).
270. 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1994); see supra notes 59-86 and accompanying text (discussing
the relationship between Customs regulations and the Tariff Act of 1930).
271. See discussion supra notes 87-106 and accompanying text (describing the "material
difference" standard).
272. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 483-84; cf NEC Elec. v. CAL Circuit Abco, 810 F.2d 1506,
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history of § 602 does the potential of an affiliate exception, or a concern
over confusion of the consumer, exist.2 73 If the products imported and
sold to United States consumers are identical to those sold to foreign con-
sumers, the authorized United States importer need only create a suffi-
ciently original label or design, register the copyright, and sue for
injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees. 27 4 The Ninth Circuit's holding
in Givenchy has made it possible to prevent the sale of gray market mer-
chandise imported under the affiliate exception.275
Thus, for identical genuine goods, the copyright law provides an end
run around the affiliate exception upheld in K Mart. That end run, how-
ever, is far from secure. First, although this civil liability will make the
sale of gray goods less profitable, it is unclear whether it will prohibitively
raise the cost of selling them.276 Second, the Supreme Court may not
look favorably look upon the use of copyright law to partially circumvent
the effects of its K Mart holding.277 The Court could be compelled to
resolve the issue if a case involving the parallel importation of copy-
righted works made in the United States appears before the Ninth Cir-
cuit. 278 Scholars have divided on whether the sale of gray market goods,
as an economic matter, benefit the United States consumer.279 Although
1509 (9th Cir.) (discussing the rationale behind the Lanham Act's affiliate exception for
identical goods), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 451 (1987); see also supra notes 72-78 (describing
the Court's construction of § 526's purpose).
273. Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482; cf. supra notes 201-29 and accompanying text (discussing
the legislative history of § 602's importation provision).
274. See generally Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp.
1378, 1392 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (enjoining the sale of gray goods based on the imports' in-
fringement of the copyright owner's distribution right), aff'd in related proceeding, Parfums
Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d. 477 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
1315 (1995).
275. See Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 479 (noting that the United States copyright holder,
Givenchy U.S.A., was wholly owned by its French parent); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(2) (1995)
(allowing gray market goods into the country where the U.S. trademark registrant shares
"common control" with the foreign trade name owner), discussed generally supra notes 66-
82 and accompanying text.
276. Cf PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITs CONSE-
QUENCES (1988) 139-52 (describing how increased product liability raises the price of man-
ufactured goods). See also supra note 263 (discussing the applicability of the Copyright
Act's damage remedies).
277. As of this writing, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Chief Justice Rehnquist still sit
on the Court. In contrast, the majority that upheld the common control exemption has lost
three of its five votes (Justices Marshall, Brennan and White) while only one dissenter has
retired. Four of nine justices are as yet untested on gray market issues.
278. Cf Givenchy, 38 F.3d at 482 n.7 (declining to pass on the facts of Sebastian); see
supra notes 165-87 and accompanying text (discussing the factual distinction between the
Givenchy and Sebastian cases).
279. Compare Hansen, supra note 2, at 265 (arguing that the gray market is more prop-
erly characterized as black) with Ghosh, supra note 2, at 428-29, 434-35 (concluding that
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no split in the circuits exists in the construction of these two sections be-
cause of the factual differences between the cases, in substance they col-
lide-in short, distinction without a difference. 280 The Supreme Court,
however, will find itself caught between the Scylla of permanently crip-
pling the "multibillion dollar industry" in gray market imports that it pro-
tected in 1988, and the Charybdis of distorting the intended scope of the
copyright law.281
V. CONCLUSION
The holding in Givenchy keeps copyright law within its intended
boundaries: to wit, those of the United States. The Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari has left the decision sitting underneath the gray market
like a land mine, waiting for the pressure of fluctuating currency rates to
detonate it. As the use of copyright law to prevent gray market sales
increases, this issue will eventually fall squarely in front of the institution
best qualified to deal with it: the Congress. For the moment, however,
copyright law has provided an end run around the K Mart decision by
allowing United States intellectual property owners to enjoin the sale of
identical goods, regardless of the affiliation between themselves and the
foreign intellectual property owner.
Christopher A. Mohr
the sale of properly labeled gray goods is economically harmless). But see BORK, supra
note 239, at 288-91 (arguing that vertical distribution restraints do not harm consumer
welfare).
280. See supra notes 175-89 and accompanying text (describing the implications of the
Third Circuit's analysis in Sebastian).
281. One important caveat exists to this statement. In the Givenchy cases, the District
Court made an express finding of fact that the perfume's box design was both prominently
featured and was an important part of the product's overall image. Parfums Givenchy, Inc.
v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 1992 WL 532116 at *1 (C.D. Cal. 1992), aff'd, 38 F.3d 477 (9th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 U.S. 1315 (1995); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C. Beauty
Sales, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1381 (C.D. Cal. 1993). Cf Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 909, 913 (D.N.J. 1987) (finding that the label carrying
the copyright "tri[ed] the limits of the modicum of creativity necessary for a work to be
copyrightable," and which presumably had little or nothing to do with promoting the prod-
uct), vacated, 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988). The relative importance of the copyrighted
material to the product's value may make it difficult for plaintiffs to recover substantial
damages. The availability of injunctive relief, however, should not be affected. See also
supra notes 247-58 (arguing that allowing § 109 to categorically extinguish the distribution
right renders § 602 meaningless, exceeds Congressional intent, and also may raise issues
under U.S. treaty obligations).
